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MAY YOU LIVE IN INTERESTING TIMESa

-

EUROPEAN TRADEMARK LAW IN THE WAKE
OF SABEL BV V. PUMA AG
John A. Tessensohn*
PART I - BACKGROUND
A.

AN INNOCENT PHRASE

Since the enactment of the Directive' for the Harmonization of
the7 Trade Mark laws of the Member States of the European
Community,' a protracted debate3 has raged as to the extent of

' Ancient Chinese proverb "May You Live In Interesting Times." One view is that when
the Chinese wish misfortune on someone, they say, "May you live in interesting times." It
is thought by some to be a blessing and by others to be a curse.
* JOHN A. TESSENSOHN has been Intellectual Property Counsel with Shusaku
Yamamoto Patent Law offices since November 1994. His main areas of practice are
International Intellectual Property Counseling including Trademarks; Patents; Trade
Secrets; Litigation and Arbitration; Unfair Competition; and Transnational Licensing. He
was included in Marquis Who's Who in the World* 1998 and 1999. John received a Masters
of Laws degree from Fordham University, graduating curn laude in 1998. He is a graduate
(with honors) from the National University of Singapore, 1992. He is admitted to practice
in Singapore (1993) and has passed the New York State Bar Exam (1998). John is a Member
of the Board of Advisors for World Intellectual Property Report, a Member of the Editorial
Board of IP Asia and Country Correspondent of European Intellectual PropertyReview. He
has also authored numerous articles published in Franklin Pierce Law Institute's IDEA - The
Journal of Law & Technology, George Mason University's Journal of InternationalLegal
Studies, Journal of the Patent & Trademark Office Society, European Intellectual Property
Review, IP Asia, Journal of the Intellectual Property Society of Australia and New Zealand,
IP WorldWide, ManagingIntellectual Propertyand World IntellectualPropertyReport. John
was a member of the International Trademark Association (INTA) Model Law Subcommittee
in 1995-96. He chaired a Luncheon Roundtable "Well Known Marks in the Asia Pacific," at
the 1997 Annual INTA Meeting and spoke at "Contested Proceedings Around the World:
Court Proceedings" at the 1998 Mid-Year INTA Meeting.
' Council Directive 89/104 to Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to
Trade Marks, 1988 O.J. (L 40) 1 [hereinafter Directive]; see also INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

LAWS OF EUROPE 542-49 (George Metaxas-Maranghidis ed., 1995) (providing the Directive).
2 In 1992, the Treaty of European Union (TEU) was renamed the EEC treaty to the
European Community Treaty. The TEU that established the European Union (EU) stands
as a separate treaty, but this treaty is largely political in nature. Therefore, when
considering issues of intellectual property law, the short-hand reference should be the
European Community (EC), and not the European Union. GUY TRrrroN, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN EUROPE 3-4 (1996).
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the rights granted to registered marks. This controversy stems
from the uncertain meaning and effect that the seemingly innocent
phrase, "likelihood of confusion which includes likelihood of
association,"has within the context of trademark registration and
infringement under Article 4(1)(b) of the Directive.4 This phrase
appears in several other important pieces of EC trademark
legislation.5 It was hoped that after nearly three years of debate,
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) would be able to resolve the
uncertainty surrounding this phrase. However, it seems likely that
the long-awaited case, Sabel BV v. Puma AG & Rudolf Dassler
Sport,6 is merely a prelude to forthcoming ECJ decisions that will
shape the contours of the scope of trademark protection in Europe.
In Sabel, the ECJ unequivocally held that "association" was but
a subset of "confusion" and thus, gave a narrow interpretation to
the provision "likelihood of confusion which includes the likelihood
of association." This holding confirmed that the mere association
which the public might make between two trade marks as a result
of their analogous semantic content is not in itself a sufficient
ground for concluding that there is a likelihood of confusion, thus

' See, e.g., Paul Harris, UK Trade Mark Law: Are you Confused? The Wagamama
Decision, 17 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 601 (1995); Peter Prescott, Has the Benelux Trade
Mark Law Been Written Into the Directive?, 19 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 99 (1997); Peter
Prescott, Think Before You Waga Finger, 18 EuR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 317 (1996); Anselm
Kamperman Sanders, The Return to Wagamama, 18 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 521 (1996);
Anselm Kamperman Sanders, The Wagamama Decision: Back to the Dark Ages of Trade
Mark Law, 18 EuR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 3 (1996).
4 Article 4(1)(b) of the Directive provides that:
A trade mark shall not be registered or, if registered, shall be liable to
be declared invalid: . .. (b) if because of its identity with, or similarity
to, the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or
services covered by the trade marks, there exists a likelihood of confusion
on the part of the public, which includes the likelihood of association
with the earlier trade mark.
Directive, supra note 1. This phrase is also found in Article 5(1)(b) of the Directive. Id.
"Council Regulation 40/94 on the Community Trade Mark, arts. 8(1)(b), 9(1)(b), 1993 O.J.
(L 11) 1, 4-5 [hereinafter Community Trademark Regulation] (using the phrase for the
relative ground for refusal and for the rights conferred by registration 550, respectively); see
also INTELLECTuAL PROPERTY LAWS OF EUROPE 550-89 (George Metaxas-Maranghidis ed.,
1995) (providing the regulation); TRrITON, supra note 2, at 145 (stating that most of the
substantive provisions of the regulation mirror those in the Directive).
6 Case C-251/95, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6191, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 445 (1998). An electronic version
of the decision can also be obtained at the Court of Justice's Home Page (last visited Oct. 20,
1998) <http'//www.europa.eu.int/cj/en/jurisp/index.htm>.
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indicating that the terms of the provision itself prevent its application where there is no likelihood of confusion on the part of the
public.
This Article will critically analyze whether or not Sabel clarified
the "likelihood of association" ambiguity. This Article will briefly
sketch the background of the Directive's enactment, as well as the
general policy, objectives, and functions of trademark law in the
EC.
This Article will also describe the diametric pre-Sabel judicial
positions expressed by the various national courts in Europe. One
such camp, championed by the Benelux courts, argued that
confusion was not required, holding that it was sufficient if one
trademark "call[ed] to mind" another trademark even though the
consumer was aware that the goods sold under the sign did not
relate or originate from the registered trademark holder.' Under
this view, infringement was present if the use of the mark brought
to mind, even subconsciously, the memory of an "association" with
the registered mark.'
Fortified firmly in the other camp, United Kingdom (UK) courts
consistently criticized the Benelux approach. These UK courts
unwaveringly held that, despite Directive-initiated amendments to
the respective national laws, it was still necessary to show a
likelihood of confusion in order to prove infringement.9 This camp
has adamantly asserted that mere association will not suffice.
This Article will also provide the factual and procedural background of Sabel and will appraise the ECJ's analysis to discern the
impact of Sabel in European trademark law and practice. It will
critically assess whether Sabel vindicated the UK courts' interpretation of the Directive and whether or not the case settled the
issues raised by the vigorous debate. This Article will examine
whether Sabel is consistent with the functions and objectives of
trademark law under EC law. More importantly, this article will
examine whether death reports of the Benelux-inspired "non-origin
association" infringement were greatly exaggerated or whether the
7 Sabel BV, 1997 E.C.R. at 1-6192,
15, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. at 470,
15 (citing as
representative of the Benelux position Case A 8215, Jullien v. Verschuere, Jur. 1983, vol. 4,
p. 36 (Judgment of May 21, 1983)).
8
Id.
' Wagamama Ltd. v. City Centre Restaurants plc, [19951 FSR 713.
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ECJ recognized the Benelux viewpoint and preserved it. This
Article will also examine whether Sabel supports the view that a
reasonable interpretation of "likelihood of association" under Article
4(1)(b) involves some dilution aspects in view of the ECJ's approval
of the distinctiveness element. In addition it will examine Sabel's
impact on look-alikes or supermarket brands that have sprung up
in Europe. Finally, this Article will give some insight into the very
interesting docket of upcoming trademark cases where the ECJ will
decide on issues of famous marks, marks with reputations, and
distinctive marks for infringement and registration purposes.
B. "ASIA MAKES THE HEADLINES, EUROPE MAKES THE MONEYV

l°

The reality of the U.S.-EC economic relationship, the Transatlantic Marketplace," may surprise those who parrot the fashionable
belittling of Europe's inextricable economic woes and unemployment problems in the mainstream media. 2 The Transatlantic
Marketplace is the world's largest economic market. The EC has
over 370 million consumers, and together the U.S. and the EC
account for fifteen trillion U.S. dollars of Gross Domestic Product,
or nearly half the goods and services produced in the entire world.
It should be noted: (a) that most international business is done by
investing and producing in foreign markets, and not by exporting
to them; and (b) that the EC dominates U.S. international investment.' 3 The EC is the U.S.'s largest commercial partner, her

"0A wisecrack from an unnamed General Electric executive. Peter Koenig, If Europe's
Dead, Why Is GE Investing Billions There?, FORTUNE, Sept. 9, 1996, at 114, available in
WESTLAW, 1996 WL 8828067.
" The EC is the biggest economic entity in the world, its eight point six trillion U.S.
dollar economy exceeds the size of the U.S. economy and is even larger than the North
Atlantic Free Trade Agreement. In fact, the EC produces about one-third of all the world's
goods and services outside the United States. Transatlantic Trade: Testimony Before the
Subcommittee on International Economic Policy & Trade of the House Committee on
InternationalRelations, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997) [hereinafter Statement of Franklin J.
Vargo] (Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce For International Trade, U.S. Department
of Commerce) available in WESTLAW 1997 WL 14150572.
" James Geary, Europe Confronts a Widening Credibility Gap, TIME, June 23, 1997, at
26, available in WESTLAW, 1997 WL 10902313.
1" Over half of the overseas production of U.S. firms globally takes place in Europe.
Affiliates of U.S. firms produce close to one trillion dollars in Europe annually, and European
affiliates in the United States produce well over $800 billion annually. Adding together the
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largest commercial customer, and her largest supplier in the
world-each year buying over one trillion dollars worth of goods
and services from U.S. companies and accounting for nearly half of
all of America's international business. Recognizing the importance
of Europe, U.S. companies have embraced the new Community
Trade Mark (CTM) system with open arms and continue to provide
the largest percentage of CTM applications. 4
Clearly, U.S.
business interests have a great deal at stake in protecting their
trademarks in the EC, and it is worthwhile to examine important
EC legal developments, like Sabel, which impact the scope and the
extent of the protection afforded the trademarks which U.S.
companies register in the EC.
C.

THE GENESIS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TRADEMARK LAW

In the early years of the EC, there was concern that the national
enforcement of trademarks could be and was used as a barrier to
trade between Member States. 5 Fortunately, the protection of
registered trademarks in the EC has become more uniform as the
direct result of harmonization efforts 6 enacted between the late
1980s and early 1990s by the European Council. 7 The chief

production of U.S. and European firms in each other's markets and trade flows across the
Atlantic shows that transatlantic trade is about two trillion dollars annually, 50% larger
than transpacific commerce. Moreover, three million Europeans work for U.S.-owned
companies in Europe, and three million Americans work for European-owned firms here. In
fact, European investment in the United States has created so many jobs that now one out
of every twelve U.S. factory workers is employed by a European-owned firm. Statement of
Franklin J. Vargo, supra note 11.
" The U.S. files about 29.5% CTM applications, followed by Germany (16.7%), the UK
(13.25%) and Spain and Italy (5.9%). Update on the Community Trade Mark (CTM), 53 Int'l
Trademark Ass'n Bull. at 1 (1998).
's TRITTON, supra note 2, at 144.
' 6 See Eric P. Raciti, The Harmonizationof Trademarksin The EuropeanCommunity: The
HarmonizationDirective And The Community Trademark, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOCY 51 (1996) (providing a useful explanation of harmonization efforts).
17
Four EU governmental institutions have the power to adopt legally binding acts on the
Union: The European Parliament, the European Council, the European Commission, and
the European Court of Justice. The Council, however, is the primary legislative body for the
EU. The European Parliament and Commission have more supervisory and advisory roles,
respectively, while the Court of Justice serves to interpret the treaty and legislation in
disputes. The European Commission issues non-binding recommendations and opinions
which are often enacted by the European Council to become binding legislation. TRrrrON,
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instruments of this harmonization include the Directive' 8 that was
enacted in 1988 and the 1993 Regulation' 9 that established the
CTM. A two-prong approach was adopted-"the Regulation to
provide the unitary community-wide mark, and the Directive to
harmonize as far as possible national trade mark laws."2 °
The Directive was enacted "to approximate the laws of the
Member States relating to trade marks" and to resolve the
differences in trademark laws between the Member States.2 ' By
approximating the laws of the Member States, the Council intended
to reduce disparities, thereby eliminating impediments to the free
movement of goods and granting the freedom to provide services
within the common market.2 2 The Directive provides specific
direction as to the contents of the laws that the Member States
must adopt to obtain harmonization of the trademark laws.2 3 In
particular, the "likelihood of association" criteria contained in the
Directive has been implemented into the respective national
Trademark Acts of nearly every Member State in the EC.24

supra note 2, at 4-6. The European Council may further the goals of the EU Treaty through
three different forms of legislative acts: Regulation, Directive and Decision; these are legally
binding on the Member States. E.C. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MATERIALS xii (Anna Booy &
Audrey Horton eds., 1994).
" Directive, supra note 1. A Directive specifies a desired result that the Member States
must achieve and Member States must enact national legislation specifying the means by
which to achieve the Directive's goal. T~rrrON, supra note 2, at 6. In the absence of
implementation of national legislation according to a Directive, an individual may rely on
the direct effect of the EU legislation. Case C-322/88, Grimaldi v. Fonds de Maladies
Professionnelles, [1991] 2 C.M.L.R. 265, 266 (1991).
19Community Trademark Regulation, supra note 5. A Regulation is an act of general
application on the Member States that normally requires no further action by a Member
State. Regulations are binding in their entirety and are directly applicable in all Member
States without the need of further enactment. TRrIrON, supra note 2, at 6.
20 mMANDA MICHAELS, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO TRADE MARK LAW § 1.15 (2d ed. 1996).
21 Directive, supra note 1, at 1.
22id.
2' Id.
The European Commission had confirmed that all 15 Member States have
incorporated into their national law Council Directive No. 89/104/EEC. Written Question E2609/96 by Nodl Mamre (M9 to the Commission, 1997 O.J. (C 83) 36.
2See

ANSELM I. SANDERS, UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW: THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTU-

AL AND INDUSTRIAL CREATIVITY 21 (1997) (indicating that Austria appears to be the sole
holdout).
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By removing practically all territorial restraints on trademark
rights,2 5 the CTM intends to be "the ultimate in harmonization of
trademark laws" within the EC, entitling trademark protection
across all Member State borders independent of the individual
national laws that govern trademarks. The CTM allows for a
single registration which covers all Member States and the grounds
for refusing to register a trademark are identical in both the
Directive and the Regulation.2 6 Therefore, the interpretation of
the "likelihood of confusion including the likelihood of association"
grounds for rejection should be the same in the Regulation and
Directive. Before going on it will be useful to examine the general
policies and functions of trademarks and the ECJ's views on the
function of the trademark which have an impact on the interpretation of the Directive.
D.

POLICY FUNCTION OF TRADEMARKS IN THE EC

Trademark law is the regulation of marketing efforts by traders.
Under the origin function, 7 a trademark enables a consumer to
distinguish between (a) goods from differing sources and (b) marks
deserving of protection because they operate as indicators of the
trade source from which goods and services come or to which goods
and services are in some other way connected. A trademark is
essentially an indication of the commercial origin of products. As
such, trademarks allow the public to distinguish between goods of
varying sources at the point of sale2" and thereby prevent consumer confusion. As an identifier of products and their sources, the
protection of trademarks ensures that the consumer can make
This lowers search and transaction
purchasing decisions. 29

' Ron Wheeldon, The Community Trademark and the Concept of Dilution, TRADEMARK
WORLD at 12 (Nov. 1994).
2 TRITTON, supra note 2, at 145.
27 W.R.CORNISH, F.B.A., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADE MARKS
AND ALLIED RIGHTS § 15-21, at 527 (3d ed. 1996).
SWilliam M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective,
30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 268 (1987).
' See Sidney A. Diamond, The Public Interest and the Trademark System, 62 J. PAT. [&
TRADEMARK] OFF. Soc'Y 528, 529 (1980) (noting that "[t]he consuming public is an unnamed
third party in every action for trademark infringement" since the interest of the consuming
public lies in the ability of the trademark to facilitate choice on the basis that a trademark
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costs, ° thereby providing the producer of the trademarked good
an incentive to maintain a consistent quality over time.3
Closely related to the origin function of trademarks is the notion
that trademark protection performs a guarantee or quality function." Essentially this notion posits that marks deserve protection because they symbolize qualities which consumers associate
with certain goods and services. As such, the marks operate as a
guarantee that the goods or services measure up to expectations.
This guaranteed quality function complements the origin function:
trademarks are necessary for the owner of the trademark to have
the exclusive right to market specified goods or services under that
mark and to safeguard this guarantee of the origin.33 Conferring
exclusive rights on registered trademark owners gives the owners
the incentive to promote the reputation of the mark and goods or
services sold under the mark, since the owners know that others
will not be able to exploit or "free-ride" the mark's reputation. 4
This protection is essential, since the free-rider's cost of copying
and applying a similar version of the senior user's mark would be
minimal in view of the widely available technology to create labels,
designs or packages.
The free-rider would otherwise capture some market share
because the consumer, in the short run at least, will be confused
and assume that the free rider and the original trademark owner's
marks are from the identical or similar origin. If the consumer can
no longer trust the quality that the mark conveys, there would be
a market breakdown. 5 Confusingly similar marks that free-ride
on the original mark may eventually destroy goodwill reposed in
the trademark, and a lack of protection against such free-riding

guarantees uniform quality at a consistent level).
' Landes & Posner, supra note 28, at 269.
31 Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Rubin, Counterfeit Goods, 29 J.L. & ECON. 211, 213
(1986).
32 CORNISH, supra note 27, § 15-21, at 527.
33
Id.
' Case C-10/89, SA. CNL-Sucal NV v. Hag GF AG, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3711, 1-3712, [19901
3 C.M.L.R. 571, 572 (1990).
' See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertaintyand the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 500 (1970) (stating that brand name goods "not only indicate
quality but also give the consumer a means of retaliation if the quality does not meet
expectations").
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may therefore diminish the incentive of producers to develop a
valuable trademark in the first place.36
The dominance of the origin function in EC trademark jurisprudence could be traced to the seminal Terrapin case.37 That case
endorsed the view that a trademark proprietor is entitled to
exercise his trademark rights to prevent the importation of similar
goods produced independently and marketed under a confusingly
similar mark of completely independent origin. Therefore, it is
clear that the ECJ gave great emphasis to the prevention of
consumer confusion. The developmental history of the ECJ's theory
regarding trade mark functions in the EC38 is lengthy and complex. It may be appropriate to refer to the dominant position which
has recently been confirmed as confined to the protection of
consumers against confusion.39 By taking steps to safeguard this
protection,4' the ECJ enables the consumer to distinguish a
particular trademarked product of another provenance.41 The
ECJ's definition of the function of a trademark is reflected in the
Recitals to both the Directive and Regulation as being "in particular to guarantee the trademark as an indication of origin."42
However, it has been pointed out that the guarantee of origin and
quality functions are just two of the many functions of trademarks' in the EC. Several provisions in the Directive and the

's Landes & Posner, supra note 28, at 270.
17 Case 9/93, Terrapin (Overseas) Ltd. v. Terranova Industrie CA Kapferer
& Co., 1976
E.C.R. 1039, [19761 1 C.M.L.R. 620 (1976).

38 INGE GOVANE, THE USE AND ABUSE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN

E.C. LAw

89-96 (1996). See also TRrrrON, supra note 2, at 320-38 (discussing recent case law); Andreas
Reindl, IntellectualPropertyand Intra-CommunityTrade, 20 FoRDHAM INTL L.J. 819,847-54
(1997) (discussing recent case law).
' Case C-9/93, IHT Internationale Heiztechnik GmbH v. Ideal-Standard GmbH, 1994
E.C.R. 1-2789, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. 857 (1994). See Guy Tritton, Articles 30 to 36 and
Intellectual Property: Is the Jurisprudenceof the ECJ Now of an Ideal-Standard?,16 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 422, 426 (1994) (arguing that the ECJ in Ideal-Standard recognized
solely consumer interest in source of products).
o TRrITON, supra note 2, at 320-38.
41 Case C-10/89, S.A. CNL-Sucal NV v. Hag GF AG, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3711, 1-3739, [19901
3 C.M.L.R. 571, 572 (1990).
42 MICHAELS, supra note 20, § 1.14.
43 Directive, supra note 1, at 2 (stating that the function of the protection afforded by the
registered trade mark is in particular to guarantee the trade mark as indication of origin).
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Regulation reflect a broader understanding of trademark rights"
which also encompasses property-like rights, not just indications of
origin.4" That association of rights gives a scope to trademark law
far wider than under a classical notion of likelihood of confusion.
This is the investment or advertisingfunction:4 6 marks are akin to
a property right, a symbol around which investment in the
promotion of a product is built. Investment is a value which
deserves protection as such, even when there is no abuse arising
from misrepresentations either about origin or quality: "The result
of the negotiations between the Member States was clear recognition that nowadays a trademark not only functions as an indication
of origin but can constitute a valuable asset in and of itself."47

"See Charles Gielen, Harmonization of Trade Mark Law in Europe: The First Trade
Mark HarmonizationDirectiveof the EuropeanCouncil, 14 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 262, 264
(1992) (emphasizing that the Directive and Regulation's statement of the origin function is
not decisive). The recitals to the 1980 and 1985 drafts of the Directive provided: "The
purpose of protection is to guarantee the trademarks function as an indicator of origin." The
final text (see Recital 10 of the Directive and Recital 7 of the CTM Regulation), however,
reads: "the protection afforded by the registered trade mark, the function of which is in
particular to guarantee the trade mark as an indication of origin...." Directive, supra note
1, at 2. Note the words "in particular." The Directive had to leave other functions open since
it provides for the possibility of wide protection of reputed marks even if no confusion arises.
Such protection can only be granted if it is accepted that the trade mark has functions other
than an indication of origin.
"Reindl, supra note 38, at 855, 859.
4CORNISH, supra note 27, § 15-21.
"' Charles Gielen & Benoit Strowel, The Benelux Trademark Act: A Guide to Trademark
Law in Europe, 86 TRADEMARK REP. 543, 564 (1996). It was also noted that
[tihe function of a trademark is twofold: identification and communication. The change from the classical origin function to these functions has
been brought about by factors such as the increasing importance of retail
trade, the decrease in quality discrepancies among products and services
and the development of lifestyle marks together with the resultant shift
in the character of the mark from the rational and physical to the
emotional and psychological. The origin of a product is of no importance
to consumers. Leaving aside the question of whether the origin as such
is disclosed, consumers are not interested in whether company A or B
manufactured the product. A consumer expects the product to fulfill
certain demands which can, and often will, be of both physical and
psychological nature. He is not interested in knowing who fulfills these
demands. His interest lies with the brand, not with the owner of the
brand. He is not concerned whether the owner or manufacturer changes,
as long as his brand (understood as the conglomerate of all the consumer's demands and expectations) does not change. If the product no longer
fulfills these demands, it will lose its appeal; if damage is caused, the
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A prime agent of this investment/advertisement function is the
concept of association. Association triggers liability based on
speculation about the possible psychological impact of the marking
or trade dress of a social group in the same way that trademark
serves as a means of communicating information, both rational and
emotional. In other words, it is a messenger. These assets are
collectively referred to as brand equity. It is very important that
brand equity be protected.4" Besides association, it has been
argued that the Directive protects registered trademarks in Europe
against dilution, and this protection emphasizes the trademark
owner's private interest by preventing damage to goodwill or the
lost sales that result from such damage.4
The rationale stems from the proverbial idea that one should not
reap what one has not sown. This idea has been transformed into
a property right where the trademark owner is rewarded for the
sustained investment in the time, advertising value and reputation
of his mark, giving trademarks a communicative value which
concerns the feelings and arouses the subconscious appreciation of
the consumer, distinct from the origin function of trademarks.5 °
This expansion of the function of trademark law beyond the
exclusive right to indicate the origin of products to consumers may
represent a significant economic value for the right holder.51
Therefore, trademarks are designed to encourage and protect the
right holder's investment and advertising function in the goodwill
of a trademark beyond the quality-function and guarantee-function.
Support for this function has been gleaned from the repackaging
cases where the ECJ recognized that, under EC law, trademark
rights protect goodwill in the trademark independent of the source
guarantee, holding that the parallel importer's use of packaging
materials that damaged the trademark's reputation permitted the
consumer will, with the help of the retailer, be able to find the company
responsible. Thus, the origin of a product is of no relevance to him.
Id. at 564 n.69.
" See Jerre B. Swam & Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Dilution,An Idea Whose Time Has Gone;
Brand Equity as Protectible Property, The New/Old Paradigm,84 TRADEMARK REP. 267
(1994) (stating that brand equity is a property right entitled to its own protection).
4
' Anselm K Sanders, Some FrequentlyAsked Questions about the 1994 UK Trade marks
Act, 17 EuR. INTELL. PRoP. REv. 67, 70 (1995).
50 SANDERS,
51 id.

supra note 24, at 103-04.
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trademark holder to oppose parallel imports of the repackaged
products.52 Trademarks are used to make the product more
attractive, not to identify the manufacturer of the product.5 3
It should be noted that, in Renault v. Audi, the ECJ ruled that,
in the absence of harmonization, national trademark law determines the criterion for deciding whether or not there is a risk of
confusion.5 However, the enactment of the Directive provisions
into national laws may achieve harmonization in the letter of the
law. There was hardly any harmonization as to the effect of such
statutory changes in view of the torrent of divergent judicial
opinions from the respective Member States' national courts
concerning the concept (confusing similarity between marks).
These were the same problems described in Terrapin.55 Therefore,
the pre-Harmonization trademark disorder-where the concept of
confusion varied from one Member State-continued into the postHarmonization period. Since the Directive was enacted to harmonize national trademark laws and to obviate the "confusion" over
the differing national standards of "confusing similarity," the ECJ's
determination in Sabel of what constituted "likelihood of association" was a major step in the harmonization of the interpretation
of national legislation implementing the terms of the harmonizing
Directive.
Therefore, it may be timely and useful to examine the respective
pre-Sabel national courts' interpretation of "likelihood of associa-

52 Joined Cases C 427, 429 & 436/93, Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Paranova, 1996 E.C.R. I-

3457, 1-3536-38,
58-66, [19971 1 C.M.L.R. 1151, 1215-16, 1 58-66 (1996).
' Neil J. Wilkof, Same Old Tricks or Something New? A View of Trade Mark Licensing
and Quality Control, 18 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 261, 268 (1996). See also Reindl, supra
note 38, at 857 (stating that a trade mark may be protected from a use that takes unfair
advantage of the trademark's reputation).
" Case C-317/91, Deutsche Renault AG v. Audi AG, 1993 E.C.R. 1-6227, 1-6257,
23,
[19951 1 C.M.L.R. 461, 476, 23 (1993).
' Case 9/93, Terrapin (Overseas) Ltd. v. Terranova Industrie CA Kapferer & Co., 1976
E.C.R. 1039, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. 620 (1976). It is worthwhile to note that Advocate General
Jacob mentioned that it was questionable whether an English court could have found a
danger of confusion, like the German courts did, in the Terrapin case; if not, the result would
be that a German manufacturer would be allowed to export to the UK but not vice versa.
Case C-10/89, S.A. CNL-Sucal NV v. Hag GF AG, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3711, 1-3739, [1990] 3
C.M.L.R. 571, 591 (1990). This was also an issue in the Tanabe-Bayer case where complaint
was made of the strictness of the German rules, as compared to the rest of the EC,
concerning confusing similarity. [1979] 2 C.M.L.R. 80 (1978).
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tion," which covers a spectrum from high protection to low protection for marks. The Benelux approach reflects a high watermark
of trademark protection in the EC with its association in the strict
sense infringement doctrine whereas the UK classic confusion as to
origin approach marks a much more conservative protection
paradigm amongst the Member State national courts. From the
cases that will be discussed, it is clear that there is not a harmonized trademark view among the Member States.

PART II - E PLURIBUS UNUM?

56

A. BENELUX - AS GOOD AS IT GETS

The logical starting point is to examine the Benelux courts'
development of the "likelihood of association" standard because it
was suggested that certain parts of the Directive were based on the
Uniform Benelux Trademark Law.5 7 The basis for this proposition
is that "[wihen the [European] Council adopted the texts of the
Trade Mark Harmonisation Directive in its meeting of 21 December
1988 and the Regulation on the Community Trade Mark in its
meeting of 20 December 1993, it also approved a series of statements for entry in the minutes of these meetings. "58 For the
purposes of this article, the most important statement was: "The
Council and the Commission note that 'likelihood of association' is
a concept which in particular has been developed by Benelux caselaw."5 9 On the face of such "documentary evidence," it was not

6The

Latin motto meaning "From many, one".

57 SANDERS, supra

note 24, at 19-22. See also Gielen, supra note 44 ("The texts of both

the CTM Regulation and the Directive were to a great extent inspired by the Benelux
Trademark Act"); Gielen & Strowel, supra note 47, at 564-65 (noting the resolutions
surrounding the adoption of the CTM Resolution and the Directive); and Ruth E. Annand,
Lookalikes Under The New UnitedKingdom Trade Marks Act 1994, 86 TRADEMARK REP. 142,
154-55 (1996) ("It is widely thought that the Benelux example was influential in drafting the
Directive. . ").
wCharles Gielen, European Trade Mark Legislation: The Statements, 18 EUR. INTELL.
PRoP. REv. 83, 83 (1996). See also Case C-251/95, Sabel BV v. Puma AG & Rudolf Dassler
Sport, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6191, 1-6241-42, 42, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 445, 459, 42 (1998) (opinion
of Advocate General Jacobs) (noting that article, authored by two members of the Benelux
delegation who were involved in negotiating the Directives, describes the discussions which

took place concerning the use of the word "association").
" Gielen, supra note 58, at 88. This Statement appears in Article 4(1)(b), 5(1)(a), and

5(1)(b) of the Directive. Directive, supra note 1. The Statement also appears with Article
8(1)(b) and 9(1)(b) of Community Trade Mark Regulation. Gielen, supra note 58, at 87.
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surprising that many believed that the "likelihood of association"
had a Benelux genesis,6" leading to a heated debate as to whether
or not these minutes6 ' can be used as an aid to the interpretation
of the concept of "likelihood of association" as formulated in the
Directive. Even though the European Court of Justice has the
power to call for minutes of Council meetings" in its deliberations, at least from the UK perspective, the position is that "no
regard can be had such statements."63 However, it appears that
this view has been undermined in view of the subsequent publication and public dissemination of these Minutes in an Official EC
journal.'

60 TRrrrON, supra note 2, at 168-69. See also Gielen, supra note 58, at 87 ("[statements]
can certainly be used to say that the words 'likelihood of association' originated from Benelux
trade mark law"); Gielen & Strowel, supra note 47, at 567 (" '[Llikelihood of association' is
a concept which in particular has been developed by Benelux case law"); Annand, supra note
57, at 154 (same).
61 The status of these minutes is subject to some controversy. There is ECJ case law
which has held that when construing the meaning of a directive, it is wrong to use the
minutes of Council meetings as an aid to interpretation. See, e.g., EC Commission v.
Belgium, [1988] 2 C.M.L.R. 865 (1988); Case C-292/89, Regina v. Immigration Appeal
Tribunal ex parte Antonissen, [1991] 2 C.M.L.R. 373 (1991); Case C-310/90, Conseil National
de L'Ordre Des Architectes v. Egle, [19921 2 C.M.L.R. 113 (1992); Case C-306/89, re
Transport Workers: EC Commission v. Greece, [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 803 (1994). See also Case
T-194194, Carvel and Guardian Newspapers Ltd. v. EU Council, [1995] 3 C.M.L.R. 359 (1995)
(describing the freedom of public access to Community documents). See also TRITTON, supra
note 2, at 169 (stating how the United Kingdom High Court has rejected the use of council
meeting minutes as interpretive tools); Prescott, supra note 3, at 100 (arguing that a "nature
democracy" should not be "ruled by minutes"). But see Gielen, supra note 58, at 83, 86
(arguing, with references to some other ECJ case law, that the statements in the minutes
can be used as a guide to the interpretation of Community legislation).
62 Annand, supra note 57, at 154.
' Abbe E.L. Brown, The Increasing Influence of Intellectual Property Cases on the
Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 18 EuR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 526, 530 (1996). See
Wagamama Ltd. v. City Centre Restaurants plc, [1995] FSR 713, 725-26 (believing that they
were confidential and unpublished, Mr. Justice Laddie concluded that the court could not use
the minutes for interpretation purposes "when the minutes themselves are closed for
inspection"). See also Prescott, supra note 3, at 100 (remarking that it would be "an
abomination, and more appropriate to a novel by Kafka for 'a mature democracy' to be 'ruled
by minutes, the complete text of which nobody (was) able to produce in court' ").
6 The Statements adopted by Council and Commission have been published in the
Official Journal of the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and
Designs). [19951 O.J. OHIM No. 5 607, 613. See Gielen & Strowel, supra note 47, at 567;
Guy TRrrrON, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN EUROPE 23 (Supp. 1997).
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The Benelux approach to "likelihood of association" is well
documented.6 5 However, it should be noted that the exact phrase
"likelihood of confusion" was not expressly used or stated in the
national Benelux Trademark Act until the Benelux implementation
of the Directive that came into effect on January 1, 1996.6
Notwithstanding this absence, under Benelux trademark law,
"likelihood of association" means whether a mark or sign is
"similar" to the mark to be protected or registered. The landmark
decision was delivered by the Benelux Court of Justice in Union.
There, the court held that there is similarity
when, taking into account the particular circumstances of the case, such as the distinctive power of
the mark, the mark and the sign, each considered as
a whole and in correlation, show such a resemblance
phonetically, visually or conceptually that by this
resemblance alone, associationsbetween the sign and
67
the mark are evoked."
The Benelux concept encompasses cases in which the mark
complained of merely "brings to mind" the more famous, established mark, but does not necessarily lead to the traditionally
recognized type of confusion, e.g., the belief that the two marks are
linked in some way, or have some common owner or source, or that
the goods that are marked with the two marks are the same.'
The possibility of conflict between the two marks includes not only
the concept of direct confusion or indirect confusion (as to the origin
of the goods or the existence of a relationship between the owners
of the two signs), but also any other case of possible conscious or

"Gielen & Strowel, supra note 47, at 564-71. See also Gielen, supra note 44, at 266
(noting the example that "Nissan Tercel" under Benelux law would be held to be associated
by the public with "Toyota Tercel" where the registered mark is Tercel" even where there
is no risk of confusion on the public as far as origin exists).
"Charles Gielen, Benelux, in FAMous AND WELL-KNoWN MARKS, AN INTERNATIONAL
ANALYSIS 199 (Frederick Mostert et. al., 1997).
" Id. See also Gielen & Strowel, supra note 47, at 566 (paraphrasing the court's
interpretation of"similarity"); Gielen & Strowel, supra note 47, at 568 (citing Union /Union
Soleure, Decision of May 20, 1983, Nederland Jurisprudentie 72 (1984)).
6MICHAELS, supra note 20, § 2.120 (discussing the need for the similarity causing the
confusion).
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subconscious association made by the public between the third
party's sign or mark and the earlier trademark.69
This kind of association does not mean that there is direct
confusion about the trademarks, their origin or the likelihood of a
relationship between the marks' owners. Instead, it deals with the
possibility of a consumer looking at the third party's sign and
automatically making a conceptual link with the earlier trademark. v° Such linking, on the one hand, would influence choice.
For example, it would subtly insinuate into the consumer's mind
the perception that some specific qualities or characteristics of the
goods or services of the earlier trade marks are also likely to be
present in those on which the later sign or mark is used. It is
important for the trademark owner to preserve the unique
association that exposure to that owner's mark brings about in the
consumer's mind. This is the case even when the consumer is not
confused, since the linking of the sign with diverging associations
undermines the advertising function of the mark.7 '
Another illustrative example is the Dutch Supreme Court's
holding that likelihood of confusion was not a criterion of Benelux
trademark law when the Court granted trademark protection to the
famous trademark MONOPOLY. "In a game that showed some
similarity with the MONOPOLY game, but was totally anticapitalistic, the trademark ANTI-MONOPOLY was used. It could
be argued that there was no risk of confusion in this case because
ANTI-MONOPOLY is the reverse of MONOPOLY. Under the
likelihood of association-concept in the Benelux, however, the
simple fact that the public would think of MONOPOLY when
seeing or hearing ANTI-MONOPOLY is sufficient to result in
trademark infringement."7 2
In assessing whether there is
likelihood of association, the Benelux courts have generally applied
the following basic principles:
1. the mark as registered is compared to the sign as
used; elements that are not registered may be taken
Gielen & Strowel, supra note 47, at 567-68.
Id.
71 Sanders, supra note 3, at 524.
72 Gielen & Strowel, supra note 47, at 566 (citing the Decision of June 24, 1977,
Nederland Jurisprudentie 83 (1978)).
69
70
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into 3account as particular circumstances of the
7

case;
2. the mark and the sign should be looked at as a
whole. 74 They may not be analyzed, and any detailed differences that may exist may not be considered. This follows from the fact that the public only
perceives distinctive signs fleetingly; and
3. more attention should be paid to the similarities
than to the differences between a mark and sign,
since it is mainly through such similarities that
associations are made.75

In any event, the infringement language of the national Benelux
Act has recently been amended to comply with the Directive, the
"likelihood of association" language is now expressly stated in the
relevant provision, 76 and the Benelux legislature considered this
to have merely codified the Benelux-judge-made concept of
likelihood of association.77
B. UNITED KINGDOM - NO ASSOCIATION PLEASE, WE'RE BRITISH

Before the Sabel decision, the UK courts took a different tack in
interpreting the "likelihood of association" criteria. These courts
challenged the wisdom, usefulness, and correctness of the Benelux
approach, as evidenced in Wagamama Ltd v. City Centre Restaurantsplc.7"

,' Id. at 567 (citing Drostei~joklat, HR 2 March 1990, Nederland Jurisprudentie 148
(1991)).
"' Id. at 568 (citing Union/Union Soleure, Decision of May 20, 1983, Nederland
Jurisprudentie
72 (1984)).
75
1Id. (citing Campari/Longoni, Court of Appeal-Hertogenbosch, August 19, 1982, 1983
Nederland Jurisprudentie 204).
76 Section 13(A)(2) of the Benelux Trademarks Act (1996) provides that the owner of the
registered trade mark may oppose "any use made in the course of trade of the mark or of a
similar sign for goods for which the mark is registered or for similar goods where there exists
a likelihood of association on the part of the public between the sign and the mark." Gielen,
supra note 66, at 203.
77 id.
78 [1995] F.S.R. 713. A Japanese restaurant in London trading as WAGAMAMA sued to
prevent another London restaurant trading as an "American theme restaurant with Indian
decor and food" under the name RAJAMAMA. The WAGAMAMA restaurant succeeded in
establishing both infringement of its registered trade mark (the word WAGAMAMA) for
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The Wagamama High Court considered the interpretation of §
10(2) of the UK Trade Marks Act 199479 that implemented Article
4(1)(b) of the Directive. The plaintiff (a) argued that § 10(2)
imported into UK law a concept of actionable "confusion", (b) stated
that the concept derives from Benelux law, and (c) tried to adduce
the minutes as documentary evidence on the point. The judge
rejected the documentary evidence, stating that it was inconclusive,
and came to his own interpretation of the words in question. He
rejected the argument that UK law should be brought into line with
Benelux law (where the "call to mind" concept of the likelihood of
association originated). He also rejected the plaintiff's argument in
the alternative that, assuming no confusion as to source, there was
a likelihood of association in the wider Benelux sense. In the
judge's view, § 10(2) was limited to "classical infringement" which
included a likelihood of origin confusion or origin association 0 but
nothing else.8 '

restaurant services and on a claim of passing off. The Judge, Mr. Justice Laddie, held that
both claims would succeed whether, the defendant operated as RAJAMAMA (one word) or
RAJA MAMA'S (two words).
See MICHAELS, supra note 20, at 185. Section 10(2) provides:
A person infringes a registered trademark if he uses in the course of
trade a sign where because
(a) the sign is identical with the trademark and is used in
relation to goods or services similar to those for which the
trademark is registered, or
(b) the sign is similar to the trademark and is used in relation
to goods or services identical with or similar to those for which
the trademark is registered, there exists a likelihood of
confusion on the part of the public, which includes the likelihood of association with the trademark.
UK Trade Marks Act, 1994, Ch. 26, § 10(2) (U.K.).
80 An example of actionable origin association given by Laddie, J., was the mistaken belief
of consumers that the alleged infringer's goods were an extension of the proprietor's range
of goods. Ravenhead Brick Co. v. Ruabon Brick & Terra Cotta Co., 54 R.P.B. 341,349 (1937).
81 Justice Laddie's forceful conclusion was as follows:
The rights of the proprietor against alleged infringers may be limited to
classic infringement which includes association as to origin or, following
the Benelux approach, it could cover not only classic infringement but
also non-origin association. In my view the former construction is to be
preferred. If the broader scope were to be adopted, the Directive and our
Act would be creating a new type of monopoly not related to the
proprietor's trade but in the trademark itself. Such a monopoly could be
likened to a quasi-copyright in the mark. However, unlike copyright,
there would be no fixed duration for the right and it would be a true
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The court found that the wording of § 10(2) clearly requires the
existence of a likelihood of confusion in the minds of the public, and
included in, but not separate to that test, was a likelihood of
association. The judge held that the test for infringement under §
10(2) was in essence no wider than it had been under the 1938 UK
Trade Marks Act. 2 The Wagamama Court held that under the
1938 Act "the confusion that was looked for was confusion as to
source or origin of the goods."83 Nevertheless, the Wagamama
Court concluded that there was confusion in the minds of the public
as to the origin of the trademark, since it was shown that the
public thought that the Rajamama restaurant might be connected
with WAGAMAMA. 4 The judge decided that "association" in this
context meant "association as to origin," thus closing the door to a
broadening of UK trademark law to include the Benelux "non-origin
association."
However, the Wagamama approach expressly
"discounted external added matter or circumstances ...

[and] the

comparison is mark for mark." 5
In British Sugar Plc v. James Robertson & Sons, Ltd.,86 Mr.
Justice Jacob was equally eager to disabuse those who had notions
of seeking to apply the Benelux non-origin association infringement
to look-alikes87 in the United Kingdom. Although British Sugar
did not consider the likelihood of confusion criteria 8 of § 10(2), it
was clear from his initial comments on the judgment that he
monopoly effective against copyist and non-copyist alike.
Waganama, [1995] F.S.R. at 730-31.
82 The 1938 Act had used the words "likely to deceive or cause confusion [and] nearly
resembl[es] [the plaintiffs mark]."
83 MICHAELS, supra note 20, § 2.117 at 42 (citing Wagamama, [1995] F.S.R. at 713).
" "[Tihat confusion is likely to take the form that some members of the public as a result
of imperfect recollection will think the marks are the same while others will think that they
are associated in the sense that one is an extension of the other ... or otherwise directed
from the same source." Wagamama, [1995] F.S.R. at 733.
' Id. Justice Laddie embraced this position from Origins Natural Resources, Inc. v.
Origin Clothing Ltd., [19951 F.S.R. 280, 284.
[19961 R.P.C. 281 (U.K Ch.).
The plaintiff had been selling a series of syrups since 1986 under the name TREAT as
part of its SILVER SPOON range. It registered TREAT as a trademark for "dessert sauces
and syrups all included in class 30" in 1992. In September 1995 the defendant introduced
a sweet spread with the words TOFFEE TREAT on the label accompanied by the Defendant's
ROBERTSON'S mark. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant's use of the word TREAT was
an infringement of its mark.
8 Mr. Justice Jacob had already concluded that the goods were not similar.
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endorsed the Wagamama approach. He expressed that it would be
"surprising" if there were any confusion between the two products
because the goods "have different primary purposes (topping rather
than spread), different presentations and both products are sold
with their house trade marks, Silver Spoon and Robertson's,
prominently displayed,"89 thereby implicitly endorsing the Wagamama origin confusion approach. 9 The Judge further remarked, in
dictum, that the Dutch ClaerynIKlarein case91 fell within the
ambit of § 10(3)92 which is the UK equivalent to the Directive's
dilution provisions, e.g., Article 5(2). This dictum will be discussed
later in this article's examination of the reputation of marks and
dilution in the EC.
Reaffirming this restrictive interpretation of Article 4(1)(b) of the
Directive was United Biscuits (UK) Ltd v. Asda Stores Ltd.,9
another look-alike case. The Judge followed the Wagamama and
Origin approaches, deciding that the court should satisfy itself as
to whether or not there is any likelihood of confusion to the public,
therefore considering whether the similar mark, PUFFIN, infringed
the registered trade mark, PENGUIN. The judge should only
compare mark with mark, disregarding the surrounding circum-

British Sugar, [1996] R.P.C. at 281.
o Heidi Hurdle, Jacob J Treats Us All!, 18 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 299, 301 (1996).
9' ClaerynlKlarein,Benelux Court of Justice, March 1, 1975, Nederland Jurisprudentie
472. See Gielen, supra note 66, at 201-202. In a case opposing the registration of the
trademark CLAERYN for Dutch gin and the trademark KLAREIN (phonetically identical in
the Dutch language) for a cleaning agent, the Benelux Court was asked to rule on the
meaning of "prejudice." The Court decided that one of the advantages of a mark is its
capacity to stimulate the desire to buy the kind of goods for which the mark is registered and
that this capacity can be adversely affected by the use of the mark or a similar sign for nonsimilar goods. Id.
92 MICHAELS, supra note 20, at 185. Section 10(3) of the UK Trademark Act is in pari
materia with Article 5(2), the main dilution provision of the Directive. Other provisions
include Article 4(3) and (4)(a) of the Directive. The conditions for protection against dilution
are: (a) the trademark has reputation in the relevant Member State or Community; (b) use
of an identical or similar sign for dissimilar goods or services is without due cause; and (c)
such use takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or repute
of the trademark. Confusion is not a condition for protection. ClaerynIKlarein did not fall
within § 10(2) because there was no likelihood of confusion as to trade origins thereby
reaffirming the notion that the anti-dilution principle of trademark law is reposed in § 10(3)
which "caters for the case where goods are vastly different but the marks the same or similar
and the proprietor needs to show that the repute of his mark was likely to be affected."
93[1997] R.P.C. 51 (1997).
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stances of the defendant's use, or external factors that might, for
the purposes of passing off operate to dispel confusion.' Since
comparison is between the plaintiffs mark and the defendant's
sign, the judge should also disregard anything about the defendant's packaging that might be confusing apart from the defendant's sign. The judge may look beyond the evidence to a greater
extent in relation to trademark infringement since, in that context,
it is necessary to regard the full scope of reasonable usage to which
the marks may be put, and not merely that which the plaintiff
happens to be using at the time. Therefore, the pre-Sabel-UK
approach was firmly entrenched in the traditional and stringent
origin/confusion orthodoxy of classic trademark infringement.
C. ITALY - WE CAME, WE SAW, WE CONCUR
96
95
It has been the established view that under Article l(1)(b)
of Italy's Trademark Law, which implemented the "likelihood of
association" criteria spelt out in the Directive, the likelihood of
confusion as to the source of origin of the product consists of the
risk that consumers may wrongfully believe that there are economic
ties or contractual relations between the manufacturers of two
goods bearing identical or similar marks, and in this sense the
manufacturer of one product exercises some influence over the
manufacturing of the other-i.e., in the risk of association of the
two signs. Therefore, as opposed to the Benelux approach, the
Italian view of association infringement requires the belief in
economic ties before actionable "association" can occur. This

9 Saville Perfumery Ltd. v. June Perfect, 58 R.P.B. 147, 175; Origins Natural Resources
v. Origin Clothing [1995] FSR 280.
95 MARIO ARRIGUCCI, Italy, in FAMOUS AND WELL-KNoWN MARKS, AN INTERNATIONAL
ANALYSIS, 336 (Frederick Mostert et al., 1997) (The Italian statute uses the term "risk of
association," while the English version speaks of "likelihood of association").
Id., app. at 637. Appendix 30 consists of extracts from the New Italian Trademark Act
(Royal Decree No. 929 of Jun 21 1942, as amended by Legislative Decree No. 480 of Dec 4,
1992 and Legislative Decree No. 198 of Mar. 19, 1996) which provides that the owner of a
registered trademark has the right to prevent third parties from unauthorized use of"a sign
identical with or similar to the registered mark, for identical or similar goods or services, if,
on account of the identity or similarity between the two signs and of the identity or
similarity among the products or services, a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public

may arise, which may also consist in a risk of association between the two signs." Id.
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interpretation involves confusion that is likely to occur as to the

source of goods, as consumers may be misled to believe that the
goods pertain to an entity that has some managerial or organizational relationship.
This traditionally held interpretation is not as protective as the
expansive Benelux approach where merely conjuring up a recollection of the earlier mark would suffice for "association." However,
when one examines a few recent decisions that have dealt with the
concept of "likelihood of association," there may be an increasing
ambiguity in the origin/confusion approach and a drifting proclivity
toward the Benelux approach. It was, however, observed that the
motivations of the Italian Courts did not always appear exhaustive
or convincing.9"
The first decision was that of the Tribunal of Udine, from May
31, 1993, where the court found that the concepts of likelihood of
confusion and likelihood of association "were more or less synonymous."98 Next is the Milan Tribunale decision, dated July 13
1995, where the court appeared to share the opinion of Italian
scholars who believe that the likelihood of association mainly refers
to the possibility that consumers are misled in connection with the
origin of the goods in the sense that they would believe that the
manufacturers, while different, are nevertheless interrelated.99
The next decision is that of the Turin Tribunale of April 22, 1996,
where
the judge explicitly held that the conflict concerns a
situation where: (1) both marks include similar
graphic features but the denominations are different
so that it is clear that the goods have a different
origin; and (2) the similarities might make the public
believe that the goods of the defendant are somewhat
analogous or equivalent to the goods of the plaintiff.
Despite the assumed possibility of the consumer
97

Fabrizio de Benedetti, Likelihood ofAssociationand the Community TM, 64 MANAGING
INTELL. PROP. 21, 24 (1996), also available at <httpj/lawmoney.oyster.co.uk/public/contents/
publications/MIP/mip96 1/mip9611.11.html> (last visited Oct. 20, 1998).
98
Id.
99
Id.
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establishing a mental link between the two signs, the
Judge did not find violation of trademark rights."'
The Milan and Turin decisions exhibit an affirmative allegiance
to the theory of an origin/confusion-based mistaken assumption of
an organizational or economic link between the two trademark
owners. It reinforced the view that the prime function of a
trademark is the "origin function," in other words, that the function
of a trademark is to signify origin of goods and services. The
touchstone of liability is confusion. The Naples Tribunale issued
the decision that marked the turning of the tide. In the Barilla
case,' the plaintiff claimed that the Defendant's mark DANIS
would create a likelihood of confusion with the plaintiffs design
mark, BARILLA, which was famous in Italy. The Naples Tribunale
ruled in favor of the plaintiff. Noting the similarity of the design
marks 10 2 at issue, the Court observed that the DANIS mark
created a likelihood of confusion even though DANIS was used on
tomato sauces and BARILLA was used on pasta. This protection
stems from the fact that BARILLA was a famous mark and enjoyed
greater protection under Italian law."°3
The importance of this decision was the Court's endorsement of
the Benelux association infringement approach' 4 shown by the
Court's statement that the graphic similarity between the two
design marks also caused the likelihood of "association of the two
signs." The Naples court was criticized for applying the provision
of Article 1(1)(b) of the Italian Trademark Act in "an usually broad

100
101

Id.
MARIO ARRIGUCHI, Italy, in TRADEMARK LAW HANDBOOK 1997 VOLUME II: INTERNA-

TIONAL 205-206 (Theodore C. Max & Reese Taylor eds., 1997) (providing an extensive
discussion and summary of the case Barilla Alimentare v. Danis S.r.l.). See also EUR. TRADE
MARK REP. 43 (1996) (providing additional discussion of the Barilla case).
'02Arriguchi, supra note 101, at 205-06. Both the:marks BARILLA and DANIS consisted
of a white ellipse enclosing a red ellipse, the latter being shifted towards the right pole of the
former and enclosing the marks "BARILLA and DANIS" respectively.
,03Id. The Court noted that, under the Italian Trademark Act currently in force (Article
1(1)(c)], the design mark BARILLA was so famous in Italy that it was protectible beyond the
scope of the goods' similarity-i.e., regardless of whether it created a risk of confusion.
104It was observed that the Naples judge fully accepted the Benelux approach. This was
not surprising as "the plaintiffs lawyers were specialists in industrial property and well
aware of the Benelux jurisprudence." Benedetti, supra note 97, at 24.
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manner."" 5 The court held that the concept of association as
used in Article 1(1)(b) is broader than that of confusion, especially
if a famous mark is involved."° According to the court, a "likelihood of association" arises whenever customers are induced to link
the original mark with the infringing mark so that those customers
tend to credit the infringing goods with the qualities and characteristics of those distinguished by the former, even if confusion as to
the actual source of goods is not possible. 10 7 This view includes
any possibility of a link between the two signs, even if merely
potential or psychological." 8 The court stressed that such a link
might consist of a simple subconscious association or subliminal
messages.' 9 It further stated that the connection that consumers
may establish between the signs and the corresponding goods
involves the risk that the qualities or characteristics of the products
of the earlier mark will be extended to those of the defendant." 0
In this case, the court found a violation of the trademark
rights."'
In the Al Gatto Nero case," 2 the Turin Tribunale found that
there was "a likelihood of association" between two cat motif
trademarks due to the complete conceptual identity of the
marks-which the public in Turin understood. The holding was
similar to that of the Barilla case. These two decisions marked the
embryonic beginnings of the Italian adoption of the classic expansive Benelux formulation of "likelihood of association." Essentially,
there was an association between the marks in the mind of the
public, and this association was sufficient for infringement. There
was no need to show confusion. Therefore, the Italian courts'
recent position is that the function of a trademark is not just to
indicate origin, but it also includes non-origin association, which is
a much broader infringement test than the earlier stipulated view.

106

Id.

10 ARRIGUCHI, supra note 101, at 205-06.
107Id. at 205-07.

'0 Id. at 207.
1 Id.
110Id.

1 Id.
112

Al Gatto Nero v. Le Chat Noir, EUR. TRADE MARK REP. 371 (providing discussion of

the case).
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D.

SOMETHING IS ROTTEN IN THE STATE OF DENMARK

Interpreting the Danish equivalent of the "likelihood of association"" 4 provision, the Supreme Court of Denmark 5 held that
there was no "likelihood of association" in the restaurant business
between the "McAllan" mark and the world famous "McDonald's"
mark. The beginnings of this 30 month long trademark infringement litigation were innocent enough when Allan Pedersen opened
a "tiny" hotdog stand" 6 named "McAllan"" 7 in the provincial
town of Silkeborg in West Denmark in December 1993.118 In a
thinly reasoned decision, the Denmark Supreme Court found no
likelihood of confusion, nor any likelihood of association, nor any
unfair advantage or detriment to the distinctive character of the
113WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK,

184 (G.R.

Hibbard ed. Clarendon Press 1987).
114 Denmark had enacted the "likelihood of association" provision in § 15 of Denmark
Trademark Act. See Dorte Marstrand-J0gensen, Supreme Court Finds No Infringement of
McDonald's Trademark By McAllan, 11 WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. (BNA) 6,7 (Jan. 1997)
(noting incorporation of "likelihood of association" provision into Denmark Trademark Act).
Id. See also Alan Bjerum Pedersen v. McDonald's Corp., USA, McDonald's Danmark
...
A/S, Denmark Supreme Court (Hojesterets) Dec. 4, 1996 Case I 355/1995, Ugeskrift for
Retsviesen 1997.253H, [hereinafter Pedersen] available at Internationalt Patent-Bureau
Home Page (visited Apr. 5, 1998) <httpJ/www.ipb.dk/ipbmcgb.htm> [hereinafter Internationalt!.
116 Stanley Ziemba, McDonald's Loses Trademark Fight, ClI. TRIB., Dec. 5, 1996, at 1.
"Anyone who has been to Denmark is probably familiar with the Danish hotdog stands,
which are either trailers or mini-restaurants (polsevogne and polsebarer)." Pedersen, supra
note 115.
"" Pedersen got the nickname McAllan after a birthday celebration many years ago over
a bottle of Macallan, the Scotch whisky. He named his stall McAllan, with the permission
of Macallan. Hilary Barnes, McDonald's Suffers Court Defeat Over Brand: Danish
stallholder wins right to sell frankfurters across the street under the name McAllan,
FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 5, 1996 at 35. It was never explained why Pederson decided to
remove the letter "A", changing "mac" to "mc". Marstrand-Jogensen, supra note 114, at 6-7.
18 Initially, McDonald's tried to settle the matter by having Pedersen use the variation
of his nickname, Mac Allan, but this was refused. McDonald's attempt to secure a temporary
injunction failed, though this was appealed. In the meantime, McDonald's secured a
permanent injunction at the Danish Maritime and Commercial Court, which decided that
there was a likelihood of confusion, in particular a likelihood of association, that Pedersen's
use took unfair advantage of, and was even detrimental to, the well-known McDonald's
mark, and was further in contravention of the Danish Marketing Practices Act. See Case
V85/1994 (Aug. 24, 1995) availableat Internationalt Patent-Bureau Home Page (visited Oct.
In the meantime,
20, 1998) <http-//www.ipb.dkUS/rrademarks/relativeiindence.htm>.
Pedersen appealed this decision to the Denmark Supreme Court, which eventually ruled in
his favor. Id.
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well-known McDonald's mark." 9
It appears that the basis for this decision was that there was no
actual competition between McDonald's and McAllan and, as such,
there was no risk of practical confusion, because the consumer will
always know whether he/she is buying fast food from the hotdog
man or from McDonald's. 2 ° It was observed that "the general
rule in trademark cases is that there should be a risk of confusion,
which there is not in this case. No one would think that he was at
a McDonald's just because the name of the hot dog stand is
McAllan." 12 1 Therefore, it can be safely concluded that the
Denmark Supreme Court clearly failed to follow the broad Benelux
approach, placing even a higher hurdle of actual confusion than the
UK Wagamama approach. The Danish Supreme Court's test was
so extreme as to require actual or real confusion.
Even though this ruling may not add insight concerning the
European courts' treatment of the concept of "likelihood of associa-

119 See Internationalt
Patent-Bureau Home Page (visited Oct. 15, 1998)
<http:/www.ipb.dkfUS/Trademarks/mcallan-mcdonalds.htm>, providing the following
English translation of the decision:
The Supreme Court's remarks McDonald's is a strongly established
and highly well-known mark. It is a characteristic and distinctive part
of McDonald's marketing, and the chain's products and services are
named with "Mc and "Mac" as the common element.
"Mc" and "Mac" are, though, common prefixes in many surnames, and
the protection of the above-mentioned use cannot be extended to enjoin
utilization of the prefixes in a surname, unless such surname is utilized
in a commercial manner which is confusingly similar to McDonald's. The
surname McAllan is clearly distinguishable from McDonald's. The
utilization of "Mc or "Mac" as a prefix to a surname such as McAllan
does not cause a risk of confusion, nor a likelihood of association between
a hotdog stand (polsevogn) trading as McAllan and McDonald's restaurants. This applies even though there is somewhat of a similarity of
services. Such a utilization of prefixes does not take an unfair advantage
of McDonalds' trademarks' distinctiveness or repute, nor is it considered
likely to be detrimental to the distinctiveness or repute.
The name McAllan is reproduced on the hotdog stand without
imitating McDonald's marketing.
As a consequence of the above, the Supreme Court finds no violation
of the Trademark Act or the Marketing Practices Act. The claim against
Allan Pedersen is therefore dismissed.
120 Marstrand-Jogensen, supra note 114.
121 Steve Weizman, Danish Hot Dog Stall Wins McDonald's Court Fight, REUTER EUR.
BUS. REP., Dec. 4, 1996, also availablein LEXIS, WORLD Library, CURNWS File (quoting
Danish trademark lawyer Henrik Holm-Nielsen).
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tion," the decision manifests a profound, near visceral, adherence
to the requirement of actual confusion. Further, the decision
betrays a disdain toward the "property right" approach toward
trademarks, an approach finding the existence of confusion even
when the mark is superlatively famous like McDonald's mark. This
is unfortunate. Clearly, after this decision, "[slomething is rotten
in the state of Denmark"'22 for trademark owners-particularly
owners of famous marks. The Supreme Court's rationale, or lack
thereof, for its determination of the meaning of "likelihood of
association" was largely conclusory. The result of the highest court
in Denmark is unsatisfactory. The one lesson that is manifestly
clear from this case is that some meaningful guidance from the
European Court of Justice is imperative to at least offer some relief
to trademark owners in Denmark.
E. GERMANY - A BOUNDING CAT-FIGHT

Finally, we will examine the jurisdiction where the res of the
Sabel decision had its origins. The pre-Directive German position
recognized the likelihood of confusion that may be present even if
the target market groups were able, in view of the differences of
the marks, to discern that different companies were responsible for
the goods or services bearing the marks, but because of special
circumstances, concluded that the two companies were linked in
commercial or organizational terms.'23 Therefore, the German
view of association did not reflect the broad Benelux approach, and
its position was leaning toward origin/confusion. The German
equivalent of Article 4(1)(b) of the Directive was enacted into
Article 14(2)2124 of the current German Trademark Law. Prior to
Shakespeare, supra note 113, at 184.
Lawrence E. Abelman, Notes from Other Nations 62 TRADEMARK REP. 383 (1972);
Gerhard Heil & Paul Strdbele, Protectionof Service Marks in Germany, 10 INT'L REV. INDUS.
PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 689, 705-06 (1979).
124 Chief Justice Willi Erdmann, Germany, in FAMOUS AND WELL-KNOWN MARKS, AN
INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS 283 app. at 629-30 (Frederick Mostert et al. eds., 1997). Third
parties shall not be permitted to make the following use in commerce without consent of the
trademark owner:
to use a mark if the "identical or similar nature of such mark to the
registered trademark and the identical or similar nature of goods or
services covered by the mark or registered trademark creates a likelihood
122
122
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the Sabel decision, there was a torrent of German trademark
infringement litigation over the "likelihood of association" criteria.125

In this flood of litigation, the German Patent Court 2 ' affirmed
27
the continued applicability of the principles of the former case law 1
on the danger of confusion between combined word marks under
the new German Trademark Act. 128 Under this rule, "danger of
confusion" caused by the mental association between the marks
under the new German Trademark Act does not carry much further
than the danger of indirect confusion under the former case law.
The danger of indirect confusion means that the consumer is able
to distinguish the marks themselves but, due to similarities
between the marks, still assumes a common origin of the respective
goods. In the German Patent Court's view, this danger of confusion, caused by mental association, is a specific case of the general
danger of confusion. The German Patent Court also noted that the
English High Court reached a similar conclusion in interpreting the
corresponding provisions of the harmonized British Trade Marks
Law. 1 29 Finding that the intention of the German lawmaker was
to facilitate the registration of marks, the German Patent Court
found that "likelihood of confusion" must now be viewed more
restrictively than it was under the old law. This decision was
appealed to the German Federal Supreme Court, the Bundesgerichtshof.
Furthermore, in an opposition brought by the trademark owner
of STEPHANSKRONE (Stephan's crown) against the mark "Konig
Stephan Wein" (King Stephan Wine), the German Patent Court

of confusion among the public, including the likelihood of association
between the mark and the registered trademark."
Id. Note the German statute uses the term "risk of association," while the English version
speaks of "likelihood of association."
126INT'L TRADEMARK ASS'N, Annual Review: The FourthAnnual InternationalReview of
Trademark Jurisprudence:Germany, 86 TRADEMARK REP. 905, 909 (1996).
126Id. at 908 (citing German Patent Court of November 7, 1995, GRUR 287 (1996)
(BRANDT ECCO/ECCO MILANO)).
" Id. (citing Hurricane, German Supreme Court, Docket No. I ZB 36/95, GRUR 319
(1991)).
" Erdmann, supra note 124, at 629 (discussing German Trademark Act of Jan. 1, 1995,

art. 19, Ch. 2, No. 2).

Wagamama Ltd. v. City Centre Restaurants plc, [1995] F.S.R. 713.
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adopted a narrow view of the new Act, rejected the opposition and
found no likelihood of confusion by association. 3 ° The Court held
that "likelihood of association" can only be assumed where the
mental association between the marks is direct and cogent. If
several mental steps are required to associate one mark with the
other, any danger of confusion (including "likelihood of association")
must be denied. In this case, it took several mental steps to
associate the meanings of the two marks, and therefore, there was
no danger of confusion. This case was also appealed to the
Bundesgerichtshof.
Heading the appellate queue at the Bundesgerichtshofwas Sabel
BV v. PumaAG' where the Bundesgerichtshofmade a provisional ruling that endorsed the traditional origin/confusion approach
and eschewed the expansive Benelux approach.'32 However, the
Bundesgerichtshofstayed the proceedings and sought a preliminary
ruling from the ECJ. 33 on whether or not the mere association
that the public might make between two marks through their
analogous semantic content was a sufficient ground for concluding
that there was a likelihood of confusion under Article 4(1)(b). At
this time, it is appropriate to discuss the Sabel decision.

30

" See Annual Review, supra note 125, at 908 (citing German Patent Court of January

10, 1996, GRUR 417 (1996)).
131German Supreme Court of June 29, 1995, GRUR 198 (1996).
132
See infra note 135 (finding that a court must focus on the overall impression of signs
rather than one specific element when making a determination of likelihood of confusion).
"3Article 177 of the EC Treaty authorizes the ECJ to render preliminary rulings on the
interpretation of the EC Treaty, the validity and interpretation of EC institutions' actions,
and the interpretation of the laws of bodies that Council acts bring into being, e.g., the
Directive. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 177, [19921 1
C.M.L.R. 573, 689 (1992). An ECJ judgment on a reference, for a preliminary ruling is
binding on the court or tribunal that referred the question and on any other court that rules
on the same issue in the future. The ECJ's judgment also functions as precedent that the
ECJ will abide by in future similar matters. Carl Otto Lenz, The Role and Mechanism of the
PreliminaryRuling Procedure, 18 FoRDHAM INVL L.J. 388, 403 (1994).
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PART III- SABEL BV v. PMA AG
A. THE FACTS

& PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF SABEL BV V. PUMA

Puma AG had registered a trademark in Germany for, inter alia,
leather goods and clothing.1 4 The mark depicted a bounding
feline in silhouette. Sabel BV subsequently applied to register in
Germany a mark in respect of similar goods. Its mark consisted of
the Sabel name and a picture of a bounding feline, although this
feline was represented differently and was not in silhouette. Puma
lodged an opposition to the application on the basis that Sabel's
mark was likely to be confused with its own mark. Its argument
was essentially that the public would associate the two marks,
since both meant the same thing (i.e., bounding felines) and both
covered similar or identical goods.
The German Patent Office rejected the opposition, finding no
resemblance between the marks for the purpose of trademark law.
On appeal by Puma, the Federal Patents Court held that there was
a resemblance between both the marks and the goods. Sabel
appealed to the Bundesgerichtshof,which granted a provisional
ruling 35 and found that there was no likelihood of confusion

" Case C-251/95, Sabel BV v. Puma AG & Rudolf Dassler Sport, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6191, 16218, It 2-5, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 445, 466-67, $ 2-5 (1998).
15
In determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion, the court must
focus on the overall impression made by the respective signs. It is not
permissible to isolate one element out of a graphic ensemble and to
restrict examination of the likelihood of confusion to that element alone.
However, an individual component may be recognized as having a
particularly distinctive character which characterizes the sign as a whole,
and, consequently, a likelihood of confusion may be found to exist if
another party's sign resembles the whole of the sign so characterized.
Even in such a case, however, the two signs must be compared in their
entirety and the comparison must not be confined to their individual
(characterizing) elements.
A sign may have a particularly distinctive character either per se or
because of the reputation the mark enjoys with the public. The more
distinctive its character, the greater the risk of confusion. However,
since no submission had been made on that point in the present case, the
starting point for examining the similarity of the two marks is that the
earlier mark has normal distinguishing characteristics.
The assessment of whether an element has such significance as to
characterize the sign as a whole is, essentially, a matter for the court
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between the two marks. However, the Bundesgerichtshofsought a
preliminary ruling from the ECJ as to whether or not the mere
existence of a common theme between the two marks-i.e., that of
a "bounding feline"-was sufficient for Puma to be able to oppose
the registration of Sabel's marks. Essentially, the Bundesgerichtshof wanted to confirm whether or not the conceptual link
between
136
the two marks required the application to be rejected.

called upon to adjudicate on the substance of the case, subject however
to its observing the rules of logic and common sense. The Bundespatentgericht (Federal Patents Court) cannot be criticized in law for stressing
the importance of the pictorial component of the SABEL mark and
considering that the textual component of the mark was of only
secondary importance.
Strict criteria must be applied with respect to the likelihood of
confusion between pictorial components which are basically descriptive
and have little imaginative content. The depiction of a bounding feline
is a pictorial component which closely follows a natural model and
reproduces the bounding motion typical of such animals. The particular
features of the depiction of the bounding feline in the Puma mark, for
example its depiction as a silhouette, are not reproduced in the SABEL
mark. The fact that there is an analogy between the pictorial components of the two marks can therefore not be adduced as a ground for
finding that there is a likelihood of confusion.
Sabel, 1997 E.C.R. at 1-6218, 1 6, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. at 467-68, 6.
1 The Bundesgerichtshofreferred to the ECJ the following two-pronged question:
With reference to the interpretation of Article 4(1)(b) of the First Council
Directive of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member
States relating to trade marks, is it sufficient for a finding that there is
a likelihood of confusion between a sign composed of text and picture and
a sign consisting merely of a picture, which is registered for identical and
similar goods and is not especially well known to the public, that the two
signs coincide as to their semantic content (in this case, a bounding
feline)?
What is the significance in this connection of the wording of the
Directive, in terms of which the likelihood of confusion includes the
likelihood that a mark may be associated with an earlier mark?
Id. at 469, 10.
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ADVOCATE GENERAL JACOBS' OPINION IN SABEL

Advocate General Jacobs (AG Jacobs) delivered his opinion"'
on the meaning of "confusion" between trade marks under the
Directive. 8' His view was that, for the purpose of comparing
trademarks, the infamous phrase "a likelihood of confusion ...
including a likelihood of association" means confusion as to the
origin of the goods or services in question. The purpose of the
"association" criteria was to clarify that "confusion" covered the
mistaken assumption of an organizational or economic link between
the undertakings marketing the products or services.3 9
AG Jacobs rejected the wider Benelux view that there will be
confusion if the use of the mark "calls to mind" the proprietor or his
mark. This rejection was based on the understanding that by
extending a trademark owner's monopoly, the Benelux rules restrict
trade between Member States, whereas the Directive is expressly
designed to guarantee the free movement of goods and services
within the internal market. Any such extension of trademark
rights and corresponding restriction on freedom to compete should
have been clear and unambiguous in the Directive. In the absence
of such clear wording, there were no grounds to assume that the
Directive intended such a significant departure from the national
laws of most of the Member States and the ECJ case law involving
a balancing of monopoly rights with the concept of a single
market. 140

..The Advocate General's duty is to present to the ECJ reasoned submissions on cases
to assist the ECJ in the performance of the ECJ's duties under the EC Treaty. Treaty
Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 166, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573, 685
(1992). Advocate Generals must analyze the case in an impartial and independent manner
and their submissions "are objective and do not represent the views of either party."
PENELOPE KENT, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 18 (1992). ECJ judges do not have, however,

an obligation either to follow the Advocate Generals' Opinion or to let it influence their
decisions. "Traditionally, however, the [Advocate Generalsl opinions carry great weight in
the [ECJ's] deliberations and often the [ECJ] will reach the same conclusion, though perhaps
on different grounds." GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN

CoMMuNITY
LAw 72 (1993).
13 8
Sabel, 1997 E.C.R. at 1-6193, 1 1, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. at 447,
'3 Id. at 457,

38.

"o Id. at 460,

46.
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Although AG Jacobs used the "non-origin association" language
and the analysis
of the Wagamama court, 4 2 he reluctantly
conceded that the ECJ "arguably recognized that trade mark law
can protect interests other than simply the right to ensure that
there is no confusion as to the origin of a product."4 His opinion
also reflected the views of the Italian pre-BARILLA camp and the
German Bundesgerichtshofs provisional Sabel ruling, which were
all faithfully entrenched in traditional concepts of consumer
confusion and origin. Finally, in view of general administrative
45
policy arguments'" and from an international perspective,
AG Jacobs felt there had to be a "genuinerisk of confusion."
AG Jacobs noted that, "if two pictorial marks convey the same
idea, there might be circumstances in which, even if the registered
mark is not well known and even if the two images are drawn as
differently as possible, the public might nevertheless confuse the
two marks," especially if the trademark consists "of an unusual
invented image, or an unusual combination of natural images." 46
Most importantly, AG Jacobs concluded that "a finding of a
likelihood of confusion may be based on the fact that the ideas
conveyed by the pictorial elements of two trade marks are similar,
provided that it is established that there is a genuine and properly
substantiatedlikelihood of confusion about the origin of the goods
or services in question." 47 This was not only an extremely
conservative approach toward confusion, but also one that is
unsupported in the actual wording of the Directive. AG Jacobs
appears to have conjured up the "genuineand properly substantiat141Id. at 458,
142Wagamama

39.
Ltd. v. City Centre Restaurants plc, [1995] F.S.R. 713.
'4 Sabel, 1997 E.C.R. at 1-6202,
32, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. at 455, 32.
1" For the proper functioning of a Community-wide registration, it was necessary that
trade marks be registrable when no genuine risk of confusion existed. Otherwise the CTM
applications will be swamped with opposition proceedings, thereby severely damaging the
prospects of success for the CTM. Id. at 463, 52.
145 Id. at 463-64,
53-54. Neither TRIPS nor the Paris Convention refers to
"association." GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay Round): Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods
(TRIPS), Dec. 15, 1993, arts. 31(a), 33 I.L.M. 81, 85; Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, art. 6 bis, 21 U.S.T. 1629, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (revised July
14, 1967).
'"
Sabel, 1997 E.C.R. at 1-6212, 61, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. at 465, 61.
47
1 Id. at 465,
63 (emphasis added).
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ed" requirement, and certainly any adoption of this approach by the
ECJ may place too high a hurdle or bar for aggrieved plaintiffs to
clear. The "genuine"standard can be interpreted as "actual" or
"concrete,"and these conditions are clearly somewhat rigorous and
exacting, matching the UK trademark infringement analysis of the
Wagamama, British Sugar and Penguin/Puffintrilogy. However,
there is no reason to require such a high standard of confusion
because even the wording in the Directive does not go so far.
Unfortunately, there is not a single iota of reference or suggestion that this "genuine and properly substantiated" standard is
included or even implied in either the CTM or the Directive.
Furthermore, AG Jacobs did not explain several pertinent and
practical points as to how one can "properly substantiate" this
"likelihood of confusion" (e.g., the evidentiary requirements, the
burden and quantum of proof required to meet such requirements,
or the market factors to consider in the determination thereof). AG
Jacobs also failed to explain the basis for this sweepingly conservative statement. Although he was correct to fault the Benelux
association approach for possibly conferring too great a monopoly
power on trademark owners, AG Jacobs is guilty of swinging the
market regulatory pendulum to the opposite extreme. He accomplishes this by creating an untrammeled, difficult to regulate,
laissez faire environment, unjustifiably disemboweling the trademark owner's right to police his mark effectively against infringers
and undermining the legitimate interests of trademark owners.
In the wake of AG Jacobs' opinion, there was an immediate
chorus of approval for his adoption of such a strict Wagamamainspired approach. Proponents declared that if the ECJ accepted
his reasoning and "non-origin association" analysis, the days of the
Benelux association infringement were numbered.'4 8 Unfortunately, there was hardly any critical analysis of the Advocate
General's elevation of the confusion standard.

148

See Oliver Gandy, Advocate General Issues Decision on Likelihood of Association of

Marks, 11 WoRLD INTELL. PROP. REP. (BNA) 229 (Jul. 1997) (representing this school of
thought).
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C. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE DECISION

The ECJ decided that "the concept of likelihood of association is
not an alternative to that of likelihood of confusion, but serves to
define its scope." 4 9 Furthermore, the registration of a similar
trademark for identical goods can only be opposed when there is a
likelihood of confusion on the part of the public. Although the ECJ
refused to endorse the Benelux position, it also failed to adopt the
overly restrictive "genuine and properly substantiated"position
adopted by the Advocate General or an express Wagamama
nomenclature and formulae for non-origin association.
The Belgian, Luxembourg, and Netherlands Governments had
pressed their claim before the ECJ, arguing that the term "likelihood of association" was included in the provisions of the Directive
at their request, 5 ° and explaining the Benelux interpretation of
the "likelihood of association."' 5 ' The ECJ summarized that
under Benelux law, the likelihood of association arises in three sets
of circumstances:
(1) where the public confuses the sign and the mark
in question (likelihood of direct confusion); (2) where
the public makes a connection between the proprietors of the sign and those of the mark and confuses
them (likelihood of indirect confusion or association);

Sabel, 1997 E.C.R. at 1-6223, 18, 11998] 1 C.M.L.R. at 470-71, 18.
This was "in order that [the relevant provisions of the Directive] should be construed
in the same manner as Article 13a of the Uniform Benelux Law on Trade Marks which
adopts the concept of resemblance between marks, rather than that of likelihood of confusion,
in defining the scope of the exclusive right conferred by a trade mark." Id. at 470, I 14.
151Id. at 470,
15.
[Biased on the idea that, where a sign is likely to give rise to association
with a mark, the public makes a connection between the sign and the
mark. Such a connection may be prejudicial to the earlier mark not only
if it gives the impression that the products have the same or a related
origin, but also where there is no likelihood of confusion between the sign
and the mark. Since perception of the sign calls to mind, often subconsciously, the memory of the mark, associations made between a sign and
a mark can result in the "goodwill" attached to the earlier mark being
transferred to the sign and dilute the image linked to that mark.
Id. (citing Case A 82/5, Jullien v. Verschuere, Jur. 1983, vol. 4, p. 3 6 (Judgment of May 21,
1983) as representative of the Benelux position).
149
150
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(3) where the public considers the sign to be similar
to the mark and perception of the sign calls to mind
the memory of the mark, although the two are not
confused (likelihood of association in the strict
sense).152

Therefore, according to the Belgian, Luxembourg, and Netherland
Governments, Article 4(1)(b) of the Directive can be applied even
"where there is no likelihood of direct or indirect confusion, but
only a likelihood of association in the strict sense." 53 The ECJ
rebuffed this Benelux invitation, accepting that only "the likelihood
of direct confusion" and the "likelihood of indirect confusion or
association" were actionable under Article 4(1)(b).1 4 The ECJ
held that the fact that the similar mark brought to mind the
registered trademark was not in itself a sufficient ground for
refusal of registration, stating that:
Article 4(1)(b) of the Directive is designed to apply
only if, by reason of the identity or similarity both of
the marks and of the goods or services which they
designate, "there exists a likelihood of confusion on
the part of the public, which includes the likelihood
of association with the earlier trade mark." It
follows from that wording that the concept of likelihood of association is not an alternative to that of
likelihood of confusion, but serves to define its scope.
The terms of [Article 4(1)(b)] itself exclude its application where there is no likelihood of confusion on
the part of the public.'55
The ECJ found support for this interpretation in the tenth recital
of the preamble to the Directive,' 56 where the material phrase

152

Sabel, 1997 E.C.R. at 1-6222,

153Id. at
154
5

5

470,
Id. at 470,

Id. at 470-71,

6 Id. at 468-69,

16, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. at 470,

16.

17.
17-18.

18.
9. The ECJ quotes the Directive, stating-

Whereas the protection afforded by the registered trade mark, the
function of which is in particular to guarantee the trade mark as an
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constitutes the specific

Therefore, the "likelihood of

association" criteria cannot apply unless there is confusion on the
part of the public. 5 v
Advocate General Jacobs also referred to this preamble in
support of his opinion.15 8 However, the similarity ends at that
point, as the ECJ did not adopt his "genuineand properly substantiated" formulation. Instead, the ECJ (a) paid more deference to
the express wording of the Directive; (b) reiterated that "Article
4(1)(b) of the Directive does not apply where there is no likelihood
of confusion on the part of the public";159 and (c) added that "the
appreciation of the likelihood of confusion 'depends on numerous
elements ... [including] the recognition of the trade mark on the
market, of the association which can be made with the used or
registered sign, of the degree of similarity between the trade mark
and the sign and between the goods or services identified.' "16o
The court concluded that "[tihe likelihood of confusion must
therefore be appreciated globally, taking into account all factors
relevant to the circumstances of the case."' 6'
The ECJ went on to say that the perception of the marks in the
mind of the average consumer played an important role here,
because the average consumer usually sees a trademark as a whole

indication of origin, is absolute in the case of identity between the mark
and the sign and goods or services; whereas the protection applies also
in case of similarity between the mark and the sign and the goods or
services; whereas it is indispensable to give an interpretation of the
concept of similarity in relation to the likelihood of confusion; whereas
the likelihood of confusion, the appreciation of which depends on
numerous elements and, in particular, on the recognition of the trade

mark on the market, of the association which can be made with the used
or registered sign, of the degree of similarity between the trade mark and
the sign and between the goods or services identified, constitutes the
specific condition for such protection; whereas the ways in which
likelihood of confusion may be established, and in particular the onus of
proof, are a matter for national procedural rules which are not prejudiced
by the directive.
Id. (quoting the Directive, supra note 1).
Sabel, 1997 E.C.R. at 1-6197,
18, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. at 471,
18.
'8 Id. at 460, 145.
'59Id. at 471, 22.
160Id.
161Id.
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and does not analyze its various details. As such, the "global
appreciation of the visual, aural or conceptual similarity of the
marks in question, must be based on the overall impression given
by the marks, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and
dominant components."16 2
Most importantly, the ECJ held that "the more distinctive the
earlier mark, the greater will be the likelihood of confusion."6 3
It was, therefore, possible that the conceptual similarity between
the marks, arising from the fact that they had an analogous
semantic content, may have given rise to a likelihood of confusion,
especially if the earlier mark had a "particularly distinctive
character, either per se or because of the reputation it enjoys with
the public."" These ECJ observations are especially crucial and
may have opened a Pandora's box of uncertainty.'6 5 The ECJ,
relying on the Bundesgerichtshofs finding of fact that the Puma
mark in question was not especially well known to the public and
consists of an image with little imaginative content, held that, even
though the marks were conceptually similar, they did not satisfy
the likelihood of confusion requirement.'
The ECJ concluded
that "mere association which the public might make between two
trade marks as a result of their analogous semantic content is not
in itself a sufficient
ground for concluding that there is a likelihood
" 167
of confusion.
PART IV - SABEL'S IMPACT ON EUROPEAN TRADEMARK LAW
A. CONFUSION

1 ASSOCIATION 0

To some degree, the ECJ's holding that likelihood of association
serves to define the scope of likelihood of confusion rather than an
alternative ground of infringement vindicates the Wagamama view
that "likelihood of association" is merely a factor to be taken into
account when determining the likelihood of confusion and is not in

'6
'63

Id. at 471, 1 23.
Sabel, 1997 E.C.R. at 1-6224, 1 24, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. at 471,

164

id.

'
'
167

24.

This uncertainty will be analyzed more fully later in the article.
Sabel, 1997 E.C.R. at 1-6225, 25, [19981 1 C.M.L.R. at 472, 1 25.
Id. at 472, 26.
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itself a ground for the refusal of registration or infringement of the
similar mark. However, the ECJ did not accept the Advocate
General's invitation to use the Wagamama "non-origin-association"
nomenclature or the "genuineand properly substantiated"requirement, and this failure will be discussed later. It is humbly submitted that the Sabel interpretation combines the approaches taken by
the confusion analysis of the European national courts, but it shed
the liberal excesses of the Benelux approach and the inflexible
dogmatism of the UK's narrow origin/confusion approach in
determining likelihood of association.
This is evidently clear from the ECJ's refusal to apply the
conceptual framework of infringement by association in the strict
sense developed by the Benelux Uniform Trade Marks Law as the
ECJ recognized two types of confusion/association. 6 ' By stressing that the sole touchstone for finding likelihood of confusion,
under Article 4(1)(b), is confusion on the part of the public, the ECJ
has excluded the application of the Benelux "strict association
without confusion" rule. Accordingly, cases such as the Italian
Barilla 69 and Al Gatto Nero"7 ' decisions, as well as the whole
corpus of Benelux association case law,' that allowed infringement by association in the strict sense may now be seen as
inconsistent with Article 4(1)(b) and are unlikely to be followed
anywhere in Europe.
By the same token, this does not mean that the strict UK
requirements of Wagamama and its issue will be the European
gospel of confusion-based trademark law. It is clear from Sabel
that the Benelux governments and the British government had
naturally taken opposing sides in the arguments before the
ECJ. "72
' To fully appreciate the context of the judgement of the
ECJ, one should note that the proceedings of the European Court

Id. at 470-71, 91 18-22.
See supra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing the Barilla case).
170Al Gatto Nero v. Le Chat Noir, EUR. TRADE MARK REP. 371 (1996); see supra note 112

'

and accompanying text (noting Al Gatto Nero as a seminal case in the movement towards
Italy's adoption of the expansive Benelux formulation of "likelihood of association").
17 See supra notes 57-77 and accompanying text (examining the Benelux courts'
development of the "likelihood of association" standard).
172Case C-251/95, Sabel BV v. Puma AG & Rudolf Dassler Sport, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6191, 16221. IT 14, 17, 11998] 1 C.M.L.R. 445, 470, 11 14, 17 (1988).
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of Justice are secret 173 and that it has long been the policy of the
ECJ "to involve all the judges in the drafting of the judgment in an
attempt to obtain the maximum consensus" among the judges.7 4
Furthermore, this consensus was usually a "Community solution"
to the legal problem that was posed. As such, it is not surprising
that the underlying policy of the ECJ was "the promotion of
European integration." 75 When considering the Sabel judgment,
it should not be lightly overlooked that the ECJ refused to accept
either (a) the Advocate General's direct and transparent appeal to
adopt the strict Wagamama approach, or (b) the similarly inspired
"genuine and properly substantiated"requirement. It is humbly
submitted that the ECJ formulated a Community solution to the
interpretation of this prickly phrase--one that neither adopts the
Benelux position of infringement by association in the strict sense
nor the orthodox UK approach (as the specific language of the
Sabel judgment includes criteria that would have been anathema
to the UK's "classic" trademark infringement by confusion approach).
As explained earlier, Wagamama and its issue adopted an
interpretation of the UK equivalent to Article 4(1)(b) of the
Directive that was cloaked "to be no wider than the old 1938 UK
test of likely to deceive or cause confusion and nearly resembling
(the plaintiffs mark)" a very narrow definition of the phrase
"likelihood of confusion which includes likelihood of association." "' There is nothing in Sabel to suggest that such a restrictive reading should be applied to Article 4(1)(b) of the Directive. In
fact, the ECJ demonstrated that it approved of the German
interpretation of this infamous phrase by affirming the criteria in
the German Bundesgerichtshofsprovisional Sabel ruling. Namely,
in determining likelihood of confusion, the court must consider the

'7 This secrecy is imperative so that it would be "impossible to accuse a judge of being
insufficiently sensitive to national interests or of having 'let his government down';" no one

outside the Court can ever know whether he vigorously defended the position adopted by his
own country or was in the forefront of those advocating a "Community solution." TREVOR C.
HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 59 (3d ed. 1994).
" Id. at 82. The ECJ has been described as one of the most "European-minded"
institutions
of the EC. Id. at 59.
75
'
Id. at 86.
"7Wagamama Ltd. v. City Centre Restaurants plc, [19951 F.S.R. 713.
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"overall impression made by the respective signs." 7 7 Marks that
have "a particularly distinctive character either per se or because
of the reputation the mark enjoys with the public"; and "the more
distinctive its character, the greater the risk of confusion. " 178
These criteria were not allowed under UK trademark law in view
of the Wagamama test as applied by British Sugar and Penguin/Puffin. There the courts expressly made "no allowance for
distinctiveness of the plaintiffs mark and the formulation of the
confusing similarity test for similar marks and goods of the same
description to require the goods to be in competition." 7 This has
even further narrowed the scope of similarity for trademark
infringement. Moreover, the Origins test for likelihood of association as approved in Wagamama and re-stated in British Sugar
requires the court to assume future notional use of the plaintiff's
mark, thereby disregarding the circumstances of the case and
acting contrary to the more flexible Sabel approach. 8 ' Therefore,
it is submitted that the ECJ has opted for a golden mean, avoiding
the extreme approaches of both the Benelux and UK camps. This
is welcome for trademark owners and participants in the Internal
Market.
Sabel unequivocally grounds the test in the requirement of
confusion on the part of the public with a global appreciation of
criteria found in the Directive itself'.' and "all the factors relevant to the circumstances of the case."8 2 Sabel held that "the
perception of the marks in the mind of the average consumer plays
a decisive role"' in the determination of confusion but that the
inquiry will not be a punctilious and didactic examination of the
various details of the mark but rather an overall impression given
by the mark.'
The Sabel formula for determining "likelihood of confusion"
between two marks is a simple balancing test. One must consider

177
178

Sabel, 1997 E.C.R. at 1-6218,
Id. at 467.

6, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. at 467,

6.

17 Isabel Davies & Ruth Annand, EuropeanCourt ofJustice:Sabel v. Puma, TRADEMARK

18, 20 (Jan. 1998).
WORLD
180Id.
181

Sabel, 1997 E.C.R. at 1-6224,

22, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. at 471,

22.

23, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. at 471,

23.

182/id.

18

184

Sabel, 1997 E.C.R. at 1-6224,
Id. at 471, 23.
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the three similarities criteria (visual, aural'and conceptual)
together with the distinctiveness of the mark (where distinctiveness
results either from distinctiveness per se or through the public
reputation of the mark itself)." 5 The likelihood of association is
a mere subset of the likelihood of confusion doctrine. The criteria
for likelihood of association is the "connection" between traders and
the strength or distinctiveness of the mark where distinctiveness
is defined as per se distinctiveness or from reputation enjoyed with
the public. Nevertheless, the final balancing act must still be
measured against the touchstone of "confusion on the part of the
public."" 6
The Benelux actionable association in the strict sense doctrine
and its progeny that found it to be prejudicial to the earlier mark
where it gives the impression of the same or related origin even
though "there is no likelihood of confusion between the sign and the
mark"'87 marked an apogee of an expanded doctrine of trademark
infringement. However, this doctrine casts an overreaching, almost
strict liability rule which results in a finding of infringement for
any marks that can be even remotely associated with the registered
mark. The current Sabel rule reflects the primacy of the prevention of consumer confusion function. In that sense, Sabel is just
another decision in the long lineage of ECJ case law that traces its
doctrinal underpinnings to the paradigmatic ECJ trademark
decision of Terrapin,8 ' thereby continuing the tradition of giving
greater emphasis to the prevention of confusion of consumers.
Protecting consumers against confusion furthers the function of
trademarks in the EC.'89 Sabel confirmed that the check and
balance is the likelihood of confusion on the part of the public. The
Sabel Court insists that the consumer confusion, and not mere
1

'" Id. at 471-72,

22-25.

8

m Id. at 470-71,
18.
Id. at 470, 15.
18 Case 9/93, Terrapin (Overseas) Ltd. v. Terranova Industrie CA Kapferer & Co., 1976
'
'87

E.C.R. 1039, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. 620 (1976); see supra note 37 and accompanying text
(discussing Terrapin).
" Case C-9/93, IHT Intl Heiztechnik GmbH and Uwe Danziger v. Ideal-Standard GmbH
and Wabco Standard GmbH, 1994 E.C.R. 1-2789, [1994] 3 C.M.L.R. 857 (1994). See Guy
Tritton, Articles 30 to 36 and Intellectual Property: Is the Jurisprudenceof the ECJ now of
an Ideal Standard?, 16 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 422, 426 (1994) (arguing that the court in
Ideal Standard recognized consumer interest only in source of products).
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association, furthers the goals of safeguarding the guarantee of the
origin of the trademarked goods and of ensuring that the trademark owner has the exclusive right to market specified goods or
services under that mark. If a third party is so easily exposed to
liability for trademark infringement under the "likelihood of
association" concepts, it would be hard for any trader to choose a
safe trademark to use in the first place.
The Sabel decision closely mirrors the pre-Barilla Italian and
German approaches which recognized both types of actionable
confusion that were accepted in Sabel. As for the Denmark
Supreme Court, it appeared that the McDonald's/McAllandecision
was especially fact-driven. The Courts adjudicating that dispute
made a finding of fact that there was not any actual or real
confusion under Article 4(1)(b), even though the situation under the
dilution provisions could have been held applicable. It is submitted
that the McDonald's/McAllan case is an aberration in nature, but
what is important to note is that trademark infringement matters
are frequently fact-driven. General principles of law are useful, but
much depends on the finding of fact-as Sabel itself demonstrated.
One lingering side issue of the Benelux/UK debate was the status
of the minutes. While the ECJ did note the Benelux governments'
claim, 9 ° the ECJ referred to the actual provisions of the Directive
itself and refrained from referring to any extraneous interpretational aids, such as the minutes, in the interpretation of the Directive. 9 ' Although the ECJ judgment did not contain any adverse
reference to the infamous minutes, it is implicit from the judgment
that any assistance or benefit that these minutes could have offered
is minimal because emphasizing the condition of "confusion on the
part of the public" and rejecting the expansive Benelux approach of
infringement by association in the strict sense dictated that the
Benelux governments' formal arguments did not persuade the
ECJ."9' 2 Hence, Sabel confirms, by implication, that the minutes
have no role or use in the interpretation of the Directive.
9 See Case C251/95, Sabel BV v. Puma AG & Rudolf Dassler Sport, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6191,

14 (1998) (stating that the Benelux
1-6221-22,
14, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 445, 470,
governments had argued that the term "likelihood of association" was included in the
Directive at their request and that it should be construed in accordance with Benelux law).
191The Advocate General was less sanguine when he declared that the Minutes were "of
42-43.
in interpreting the Directive." Id. at 458-59,
no assistance
19
2 Id.

at 458-59, $ 42-43.
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B. A DASH OF DISTINCTIVENESS HELPS DETERMINE, NOT REPLACE,
CONFUSION

However, as indicated earlier,19 3 the "property-rights" approach
of trademark law was designed to encourage and protect the right
holder's investment in a trademark. The ECJ, in the repackaging
cases, has continually recognized that trademark rights protect
goodwill in the trademark. Though the source guarantee holding
allows a parallel importer to use packaging materials which can
damage the trademark's reputation, the trademark holder is
permitted to oppose parallel imports of the repackaged products. 194 The recent trademark repackaging cases of Dior v. Evora
and Loendersloot v. Ballantine'9 5 confirm that the ECJ views the
protection of trademark against damage to its reputation as a
legitimate interest of trademark protection.
This policy of trademark law has developed from a Lockean
natural property right, where effort creates property. 9 '
In
trademark law, it is the marketing and advertising efforts that
enhance the product and goodwill associated with the trademark
that should be protected. In reaching a community solution to this
problem, Sabel may have recognized this Lockean right by inserting
the criteria of the "distinctiveness of the mark" into the determination of "likelihood of confusion." A distinctive mark that is per se
distinctive, or distinctive due to its reputation enjoyed with the
public, merits protection since time and effort is expended by the
trademark owner to choose such a mark to attain such distinctiveness--e.g., brand focus group experiments, market surveys and

" See supra text accompanying notes 43-51 (discussing the "investment or advertising
function").
- Case C 427, 429 & 436/93, Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Paranova, 1996 E.C.R. 1-3457, 13536, 57, [19971 1 C.M.L.R. 1151, 1215, 57 (1997).
" Case C-337/95, Parfums Christian Dior SA and Parfums Christian Dior BV v. Evora
BV, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6013; Case C-349/95, Loendersloot v. George Ballantine & Son, Ltd., 1997
E.C.R. 1-6227. These two cases pertain to an interpretation of the exhaustion of rights rule,
and thus necessarily concern goods which are identical to those of the trademark proprietor.
These cases reaffirm the ECJ's belief in granting protection, in particular circumstances, if
the re-sale or advertising can be shown to seriously damage the reputation of the goods.
" Although Locke expressly referred to copyright, it has been accepted that this
universal prohibition against "reaping what one has not sown" applies to trademarks as well.
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES of CIviL GOvERNMENT (1690).
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brand testing exercises, and advertising and marketing campaigns.
Moreover, recall the universal truism that the junior user with
a similar mark always has "an infinity of other names to choose
from without infringing" 9 the senior mark. Sabel acknowledges
this wisdom by giving some consideration to the distinctiveness
element in the determination of the "likelihood of confusion."
However, the impact of the distinctiveness of the mark is still
conditioned on the findings of a likelihood of confusion on the part
of the public before there can be any infringement. Like any
property right, clearly defined boundaries and limits are needed.
However, the Benelux actionable association in the strict sense
blurs these limits to the point of disappearance. While recognition
of the distinctiveness of the mark was also expressly rejected in the
UK hardline Wagamama approach, the ECJ supports a balanced
approach toward trademark protection.
Free-riding will destroy the goodwill of a mark, leading to the
diminution in the incentive of producers to develop a valuable
trademark in the first place.'
Although overprotection can
impose unnatural and wasteful restrictions in the marketplace,
under-protection should also be avoided. In this regard, it was the
stated policy of the EC, when it passed the trademark harmonization legislation, not to encourage monopolies or distort competition
in the Internal Market. In the actual wording of the Regulation,' 99 the EC expressed that it did not want to create market
distortions and that having any extreme confusion infringement
criteria may create a needless and unnecessary burden on companies. Having such a liberal Benelux approach to determining
similarity would have a paralyzing effect on businesses that file
large amounts of trademark applications-as (a) there would be a
tedious trademark clearance procedure,2 °0 and (b) the strict UK
"7 Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348, 361, 76 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 374, 384 (9th
Cir. 1948).
...Landes & Posner, supra note 28.
199"[B] arriers to free movement of goods and services [must] be removed and arrangements be instituted which insure that competition is not distorted ....
Community
Trademark Regulation, supra note 5, at 1.
'00 In the marketplace, companies expend great amounts of time and resources in
selecting and clearing marks that can be used without infringing with other registrations
and the burden of such trademark conflict clearance can be unbearable in the face of an
amorphous, widening criteria of likelihood of association where the sign resembles and
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Wagamama approach had already unfairly discounted the element
of distinctiveness of a mark and other modern dynamic standards
in the determination of the likelihood of confusion. This element
of distinctiveness is important, because not all marks have the
sufficient reputation to avail themselves of the dilution provisions
of the Directive.
C. REPORTS OF THE DEMISE OF THE BENELUX APPROACH ARE NOT
EXAGGERATED ...

One has to closely examine Sabel to see whether reports of the
demise of the Benelux approach may have been exaggerated. As
explained earlier, the ECJ did not adopt the AG Jacobs' Opinion,
which was hostile to the Benelux association doctrine and exhorted
the ECJ to embrace the Wagamama "non-origin association"
approach in its entirety. Also, it has been argued that there was
little, let alone adverse, reference in Sabel regarding the "origin
confusion"; therefore, in allowing the argument by failing to frame
the discussion in terms of "origin confusion," Sabel recognized the
non-origin association viewpoint.2 0 1
Unfortunately, such wishful thinking should be dispelled. The
ECJ clearly outlined the different perspectives on the "likelihood of
confusion" and specifically stated that the mere likelihood of
association in the strict sense is not enough." 2 The likelihood of
association was defined as including, not only where there is an
impression that the products have the same or related origin, but

reminds one of the mark, but there is no confusion. For multi-national corporations with
warehouse-sized portfolios of trademarks, e.g., leading brand giants like Unilever or Proctor
& Gamble, the tedious task of selecting and clearing a trademark in the EC, under the broad
Benelux association concept of similarity, will be paralyzed by the linguistic differences of
more than 10 languages, as many more dialects and arcane cultural nuances could trigger
this association. As a result, the effect of trademark searches for similarity cannot be easily
evaluated. Not only will it be an uphill task, but the cost of undertaking such a Herculean
trademark selection process for a new product/service may cost millions that could be spent
more productively elsewhere. Such enormous expenditures and protracted exercises can
easily cripple smaller enterprises which may not have adequate resources to select a mark
that is safe from infringement by association in a strict sense.
201 Davies & Annand, supra note 179, at 20.

o Case C-251/95, Sabel BV v. Puma AG & Rudolf Dassler Sport, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6191, 16222-23, 1 16-17, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 445, 470-71, 1 16-17 (1998).
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also where no confusion exists between the sign and the mark. °3
Confusion on the part of the public was the focus of the debate.
The ECJ affirmatively decided that confusion must occur before
liability can result under Article 4(1)(b), thereby diminishing the
Benelux association in the strict sense without the confusion
concept. There is no need for an express rejection of the "non-origin
association" nomenclature in a judgment since the elements of the
ECJ's judgement amount to the same conclusion.
Additional evidence of the alleged survival of the expansive
Benelux doctrine is found in the commentary 2°4 that Sabel has a
ring of familiarity with the locus classicus of Benelux likelihood of
association law, the Union case.20 5 Under Union, the Benelux
Court of Justice held that "mere association was not sufficient
under Benelux law either" and that the likelihood of association
should be assessed on the basis not only of visual, aural, or
conceptual similarity, but also by taking into account all particular
circumstances of the case-such as the distinctiveness of the
mark. 2 6 Based on all of these elements, it has been argued that
Sabel did not depart significantly from the original rule in Union.
However, this is an egregious oversimplification.
The fundamental inquiry is to determine whether the Benelux
approach has met its demise by examining whether the rationale
of Union actually survives or whether it is similar to the rationale
of Sabel. Upon a cursory reading of Union, it appears that mere
impression, standing alone, is insufficient. Global and overall
impression may seem consistent with the Sabel "likelihood of
confusion" criterion, but the piece de' resistance of the Benelux law
of association as represented by Union was that there will be
trademark infringement under a likelihood of association standard

Id. at 470, 15.
Gielen, Puma v. Sabel, European Court of Justice, 11 November 1997, Case
nr. 251/95: Case Comment, 12 WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. (BNA) 66, 66 (Feb. 1998).
2 5
Geilen & Strowel, supranote 47, at 566 (citing Union/UnionSoleure, Decision of May
20, 1983 Nederland Jurisprudentie 72 (1984)).
See Gielen, supra note 204, at 66-7 (noting that all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case must be taken into account).
203

'2oCharles
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in the strict sense without the risk of direct or indirect confusion." ' However, it must be noted that the ECJ had shaved off
the "absence of confusion" element in its criteria. Like Samson
without his hair, the continued relevance and importance of Union,
without the requirement of likelihood of association in the strict
sense and without the risk of direct or indirect confusion, are
clearly in doubt.
Supporting the demise of Union are the previous comments,
which appeared in several published articles, as they repeatedly
and expressly conclude that Union excludes the "risk of confusion. " ' °8 The Sabel "balance of factors" test is grounded in the
requirement of "confusion on the part of the public."" 9 Even
though some Union elements appear to match the post-Sabel
trademark world order, the heart of the Benelux trademark
infringement law, which is based on a likelihood of association in
the strict sense without the risk of direct or indirect confusion, has
stopped beating to the same rhythm as the Sabel verdict. Only a
tremendously generous reading of Sabel and a phenomenal stretch
of reasoning could enable one to conclude that Union has a familiar
ring to Sabel. In view of the aforesaid, the reports of the demise of
the Benelux approach are not exaggerated or justified.
D. SABEL MAY BE A BROADER TEST OF CONFUSION BUT ...

Trademark owners may be heartened by the ECJ's apparent
sympathy to marks of "particularly distinctive character, either per
se or because of the reputation it enjoys with the public."2 10
Essentially, the owners may be able to use this observation to seek
protection for distinctive trademarks-just as the ECJ. Following
the German Courts' finding of fact, the ECJ decided that the mark
'2 Sabel, 1997 E.C.R. at 1-6222, 1 16, (1998] 1 C.M.L.R. at 470, 1 16 (defining likelihood
of association in the strict sense as "where the public considers the sign to be similar to the
mark and perception of the sign calls to mind the memory of the mark, although the two are
not confused").
' See Gielen & Strowel, supra note 47, at 566 (stating that "[tihe risk of confusion was
not mentioned" in Union); see also Gielen, supra note 44, at 266 (concluding its observation
of Union with "[a]s one can see, risk of confusion does not play a role under Benelux
trademark law").
m Sabel, 1997 E.C.R. at 1-6223, 18, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. at 470, 18.
210 Id. at 471,

24.
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in Sabel was not particularly well known to the public and that it
contained little imaginative content.2 1 ' It has been suggested
that "if the senior trademark had a reputation (or even was wellknown), the case might have been decided differently."2 12
Another variation of this view is that Sabel suggests the
"interpretation of 'likelihood of association' by, in particular,
affording protection to reputed marks without likelihood of
confusion against, in short, damage from dilution and damage to
reputation"21 3 under Article 4(1)(b). It was argued that:
[tihe Court would probably afford protection against
dilution in a case concerning a reputed mark.. . (as)
...the Court considers that the interpretation of the
words "which include a likelihood of association" is
not refuted by the provision of the protection of
reputed marks based on which the proprietor can
prohibit the use of signs identical with or similar to
his mark and does not require proof of likelihood of
confusion, "even where there is no similarity between
the goods in question.2 14
The word "even" indicated that the Court would be willing, in the
case of reputed marks, to deem that there is a risk of dilution or
damage to the repute of the mark if an identical sign is used for
similar goods or services.21 5
Therefore, like a phoenix rising out of the ashes of the trashed
Benelux approach, there appears to be new hope for owners of
distinctive marks that enjoy distinctiveness per se or from the
reputation enjoyed in the public, as the ECJ may probably afford
protection for the distinctive mark without confusion.
This is an unfortunate misreading of the statement in the Sabel
judgement. The context where the phrase "even if there is no

Id. at 471-72, 25.
Jurgen Betten, European Union . Ruling on Likelihood of Association, 53 INT'L
TRADEMARK ASSN BULL. 2 (Jan. 15, 1998).
211
212

212 Gielen, supra note 204, at 67.
2 14

Sabel, 1997 E.C.R. at 1-6223, 20, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. at 471,
supra note 204, at 67 (emphasis added).

20 (emphasis added).

215Gielen,
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similarity between the goods in question"2 16 appears in the
judgement relates to the meaning of the dilution provisions of the
Trademark Directive and not Article 4(1)(b). This is clear when one
examines the context of this talismanic "even." For the sake of
clarity, the relevant portions of the judgement are reproduced in
full:
Furthermore, the interpretation given in paragraph
18217 of this judgment is not inconsistent with Article 4(3) and (4)(a) and Article 5(2) of the Directive,
which permit the proprietor of a trade mark which
has a reputation to prohibit the use without due
cause of signs identical with or similar to his mark
and do not require proof of likelihood of confusion,
even where there is no similarity between the goods
in question.
In that respect, it is sufficient to note that, unlike
Article 4(1)(b), those provisions apply exclusively to
marks which have a reputation and on condition that
use of the third party's mark without due cause
takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the
distinctive
character or the repute of the trade
18
mark.
First, the focus of paragraph 20 relates to the dilution provisions
contained in Articles 4(3), (4)(a), and 5(2) of the Directive. In view
of the presence of "which", the last phrase, "even where there is no

20, [19981 1 C.M.L.R. at 445, 20.
Paragraph 18 of Sabel is as follows:
In that connection, it is to be remembered that Article 4(1)(b) of the
Directive is designed to apply only if, by reason of the identity or
similarity both of the marks and of the goods or services which they
designate, "there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public,
which includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark."
It follows from that wording that the concept of likelihood of association
is not an alternative to that of likelihood of confusion, but serves to
define its scope. The terms of the provision itself exclude its application
where there is no likelihood of confusion on the part of the public.
Id. at
18.
218 470-71,
Id.at 470, 1 20-21 (emphasis added).
216

Sabel, 1997 E.C.R. at 1-6223,

217
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similarity between the goods in question", concerns the dilution
provisions of the Trademark Directive found at the second line of
paragraph 20 of the judgement.219 It is clear from a simple
cursory reading of the provisions of Article 4(3), (4)(a), and Article
5(2) of the Directive that they apply "even where there is no
similarity between the goods in question."22
Therefore, the
"even" must be read in the context of Articles 4(3), (4)(a), and 5(2)
of the Directive-and not in the context of Article 4(1)(b). There is
also no "likelihood of association" criteria in Articles 4(3), (4)(a), or
5(2) of the Directive.
Moreover, the next paragraph supports this meaning. In it, the
ECJ refers to Article 4(3), (4)(a), and Article 5(2) of the Directive as
"thoseprovisions"which are "unlike Article 4(1)(b)." Therefore, we
must read the "even" in the context of the judgment. As such, the
interpretation of "likelihood of association"-which posits that
reputed marks are protected under Article 4(1)(b) without confusion-is wrong in view of the internal logic and analysis of these
two paragraphs.
The ECJ's express framing of the element of distinctiveness as
part of the "likelihood of confusion" criterion supports this view. It
is submitted that the ECJ made its observations rescinding the
distinctiveness of the mark as a useful element toward the
determination of the "likelihood of confusion" and that the criterion
of distinctiveness does not trump the requirement of "likelihood of
confusion" on the part of the public. Therefore, distinctiveness
depends on confusion and not vice versa.
Support for this interpretation is found in Sabel itself. There,
the ECJ predicated its entire discussion on the association and
distinctiveness element,22 ' by stating that "Article 4(1)(b) of the
Directive does not apply where there is no likelihood of confusion
on the part of the public."222 Therefore, the distinctiveness of a
trademark is another factor in determining the "likelihood of
confusion" on the part of the public; distinctiveness-either per se
or through reputation enjoyed with the public-does not eclipse the

9

Id. at 470,
= Id.

21

20.

221Id. at 471-72,
n2

22-25.

Sabel, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-6224,

22, [19981 1 C.M.L.R. at 471,

22.
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requirement of finding consumer confusion as to origin of the mark.
Moreover, it is highly likely that, in view of the ECJ's paramount
policy and of Article 4(1)(b) of the Directive, the "distinctiveness" of
a mark is not the magic bullet to catch the junior mark without
likelihood of confusion on the part of the public between the marks.
This reading is derived from ECJ's paramount policy of avoiding/preventing consumer confusion with trademark goods.
The ECJ may have left open a crack for owners of famous or
distinctive marks to rely on resemblance or recognition alone in
determining that a likelihood of confusion exists; this goes a little
further than mere association. While there will not be infringement by association in the strict sense, there may be some
actionable trademark infringement if the senior mark was distinctive enough. However, there must still be a showing of a likelihood
of confusion.
E. HOT ON THE PAWS OF SABEL

The impact of Sabel was swift and immediate. Applying Sabel,
the UK Court of Appeals, in EuropeanLtd. v. EconomistNewspaper
Ltd.,223 held that there was no likelihood of confusion between the
marks "The European" and "European Voice." 224 This decision is
the first trademark infringement case to be considered by a
European appellate court under the post-Sabel trademark order.
Lord Justice Millett ruled that the correct approach to be taken
in such trademark infringement cases was for the judge to adopt a
"global appreciation of the visual, aural or conceptual similarity of
the marks "225 and to consider that the "more descriptive and less
distinctive the major feature of a mark, the less the likelihood of

' The European Ltd. v. The Economist Newspaper Ltd., [1998] E.M.L.R. 536, [1998]
F.S.R. 283.
The plaintiff had registered its mark -The European" under the UK Trade Marks Act
1938 without the need for it to disclaim the word "European." The European newspaper has
been published in the United Kingdom since May 1990 and, until the defendant started
publishing its newspaper, was the only newspaper sold in the United Kingdom having the
word "European" as part of its name. The main issue to be considered was whether the
defendant's sign "European Voice" was confusingly similar to the plaintiffs registered
trademark which is registered in respect of "Newspapers" . Id.
22

Id. at 285.
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confusion."2 2 6 These criteria, taken from Sabel,22 7 appears to
have overruled the approach taken by Mr. Justice Jacob in British
2 28 The UK Court of Appeals
Sugar.
observed that since the "EUROPEAN" element of the mark was "not the essential feature of the
plaintiffs mark which indicated the trade origin of its publication,"
there was no likelihood of infringement and hence no infringement.2 9 Although the Court of Appeals could have been more
rigorous in its reasoning, this ruling appears to be consistent with
the Sabel approach, since the "European" was not distinctive
enough to meet the likelihood of confusion requirement under the
Directive, as enacted in §10(2) of the UK trademark legislation.
In Yakult v. Danone,230 the District Court of The Hague applied
the Sabel test for assessing the likelihood of confusion, noting that
one should take into account all of the circumstances of the case
and that there is no need to show actual confusion. The District
Court held that there was likelihood of confusion in this case, since
the shape of the container of Yakult's special milk drink was
infringed by Danone's similarly shaped container. Clearly, there
has been some attempt by the national courts to apply the Sabel
test of likelihood of confusion. However, these are but baby-steps
towards a harmonized EC trademark law.
F. CAN SABEL CLAW THE LOOKALIKES INTO SUBMISSION?

The prospect of extending the meaning and widening the scope
of trademark infringement under the Benelux association naturally
excites leading market brand owners, who have been plagued2 3 '
by look-alike supermarket brands 3 2 and/or private labels. Pres-

SId.
Sabel, 1997 E.C.R. at 1-6224, 22, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. at 471, 23.
2w British Sugar PLC v. James Robertson & Sons Ltd., [19961 R.P.C. 281.
mid.
' Decision of February 13, 1998, not yet reported.
21 See Belinda Mills, Own Label Products and the "Lookalike" Phenomenon: A Lack of
Trade Dress and Unfair Competition Protection, 17 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 116 (1995)
(describing the legal challenges facing brand owners in the absence of this extension).
232 Look-alikes are known as private label brands in the U.S. See Conopco, Inc. v. May
Dep't Stores Co., 46 F.3d 1556, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (altering the U.S.
position on look-alikes); see also Samuel D. Rosen & Lisa M. Gigliotti, Conopco-Kaputcofor
Trade Dress Plaintiffs?,85 TRADEMARK REP. 135 (1985) (arguing that the Conopco result is
'
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ently, the name brands have difficulty proving customer confusion.
Look-alike products are designed or packaged to resemble brand
leaders and are particularly common in the grocery sector. The
broadest interpretation of similarity in the harmonized European
infringement criteria is necessary if effective trademark protection
is to be gained against own-brand look-alikes. However, the truth
is that these products have rarely confused consumers.2 3 Ownbrand look-alikes are shrewd clones of brand leaders and usually
take only certain images, clearly distinguishing the product by
retailers' logos and/or names. Market leading brand owners
complain that look-alikes can free-ride on the goodwill of the more
established market leaders in the supermarket shelves2" by
piggybacking on the brand image of the market leader. If the
principles established in Benelux law were held to apply in Sabel,
then the scope for infringement action against look-alikes would be
greatly enhanced. 5

an aberration).
Annand, supra note 57, at 155 n.82. Annand describes the empirical results:
Two surveys carried out on United Kingdom consumers in mid-April
1994 were referred to during parliamentary debates on the Trade Marks
Bill (Dame Peggy Fenner, Hansard, HIJPBC, April 18, 1994, col. 662)
and were widely reported in the press. It was claimed that 78% of the
consumers surveyed in each case said that they had never been confused
by own-brand lookalikes. The Independent Newspaper reported on
October 31, 1995 that according to the Consumers' Association only 3%
of United Kingdom shoppers mistakenly basket lookalike products-or
indeed branded products.
Id.
234 See id. at 143 (describing the acrimonious debate).
2" Id. at 156. Annand uses the Benelux case of Always/Regina to illustrate how such
protection can be secured:
Procter and Gamble decided to depart from the market norm of muted
messages in designing packaging for their ALWAYS sanitary towels.
The packaging employed primary colors, bright green or bright blue,
displayed the ALWAYS mark, logo and product information in yellowbordered boxes and contained a stylized representation of the particular
model of towel in the lower quadrant of the yellow-bordered box on the
front of the product. The towels were launched on inter alia the Belgian
market amid heavy media advertising which emphasized the bold
packaging. The ALWAYS packages were registered as Benelux
trademarks. Regina hopped on the bandwagon and remarketed their
sanitary towels in purple and pink packaging, with yellow-boxed
information and a stylized picture of a sanitary towel interrupting the
yellow line which divided the two sections of the front information box.
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Just as leading brand owners were dismayed after the Wagamama decision rejected the broad Benelux association infringement
test, Sabel will be greeted with some mixed disappointment. While
Sabel failed to depart from the likelihood of confusion requirement
under Article 4(1)(b), the decision did affirmatively conclude that,
under the dilution provisions of the Directive (e.g., Article 5(2)),
there is no need for confusion. 6 As a result, brand owners will
point out that the Sabel decision enshrines and highlights the
following anomaly:1 7 European trademark law strangely grants
greater protection for a mark against signs for dissimilar
goods,23 8 while providing lesser protection for the same mark from
similar signs for similar goods. However, the commentators who
decry this anomaly have unwittingly intermingled the standards of
dilution infringement by, trying to sneak the non-confusion
infringement protection of dilution (chiefly reposed in Article 5(2)

The REGINA towels were clearly distinguishable from the ALWAYS
towels because of the presence on the formers' packaging of the REGINA
mark and distinctive logo. The Brussels Court of Appeal held that there
was similarity between the overall appearance of the two products;
Procter and Gamble's registrations for the ALWAYS packages were
therefore infringed. The Court stressed that it is the similarities in
packaging which must be compared and dismissed Regina's argument
that the Directive required the Court to import into Article 13.A.1 of the
Uniform Benelux Trademarks Law a criterion of source confusion.
Id. (citing Always v. Regina, Case No. 22, I.E.C. 112 (Brussels Ct. of App. 1993) (Belg.)).
This confirms the view that Baywatch Prod. Inc. v. Home Video Channel, [19971 F.S.R.
22 (ch. 1997), was wrongly decided. Baywatch Productionsrequired confusion before marks
with reputation could get protection from infringement from use of the mark on dissimilar
goods. Recall Justice Jacob's comments about Article 5(2) and the requirements of dilution.
See supra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of confusion between marks
in British Sugar).
" The anomaly exists because confusion is not required by Articles 4(3) and 4(4)(a) and
Article 5(2) of the Directive, which embody the dilution doctrine. Directive, supra note 1,
arts. 4(3), 4(4)(a), 5(2). If, therefore, there can be infringement without confusion under
Articles 4(3) and 4(4)(a) and Article 5(2) where the goods are completely different, a fortiori,
there should be infringement without confusion under Article 4(1)(b). If this were not the
case, it would be a strange paradox. See Sanders, supra note 49, at 69-72 (1995) (arguing
that if protection is granted on a basis other than the source doctrine for use of marks on
non-similar goods, this must surely be the case for similar goods).
See Gielen, supra note 204 (arguing that it is strange to protect marks against signs
for dissimilar products against dilution but not when goods are similar) (citing Piper in
Germany, Gewerbliche Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 162 (1993), Van Manen, Bijbiad bUi
de IndustrieleEigendom 155 (1997), and Gielen Intellectuele.Eigendomen Reclamerecht 190
(1996)).
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of the Directive) 9 into the "likelihood of confusion" provision in
the Directive (namely Article 4(1)(b)).
G. DILUTION IS SOMETHING COMPLETELY DIFFERENT

Before the Sabel decision, the Trojan horse employed to sneak
this anti-dilution element into Article 4(1)(b) was the expansive
Benelux doctrine of infringement by association in the strict sense.
Sabel correctly rejected this because, in the plain reading of the
language of Article 4(1)(b), infringement by likelihood of confusion
had been measured by confusion on the part of the general public.
Moreover, the Sabel court had specifically acknowledged that the
material distinction between Article 4(1)(b) and the dilution
provisions in the Directive (e.g., Article 5(2)) is "confusion on the
part of the public."2 40

The anti-dilution doctrine enables the

trademark proprietor to protect his mark against forms of use when
the traditional requirement of likelihood of confusion is absent.
Essentially, the anti-dilution doctrine does not seek to protect the
indication of origin which the trademark represents, but rather it
protects the distinctive quality embodied in the mark.241 The
doctrine does not protect against deception as to origin of goods but
protects against detrimental effects to the distinctive character and
unique quality of the mark through its association with other
goods. The fait accompli of dilution is the strong reputation of the
mark.
Reputation is a function of dilution, whereas confusion is a
function of similar mark/similar goods trademark infringement. A
closer examination of the tabulated differences of Articles 4(1)(b)
and 5(2) is instructive:

'9 The substantive elements of the articles addressing dilution are identical. Articles 4(3)
and 4(4)(a) of the Directive and Article 9(l)(c) of the Regulation are for registration purposes,
and Article 5(2) of the Directive is for infringement purposes. Community Trademark
Regulation, supra note 5, art. 9(1)(c); Directive, supra note 1, arts. 4(3), 4(4)(a) & 5(2). For
the sake of brevity, reference will be made to Article 5(2) since we are considering
enforcement on behalf of trademark owners in this part of the paper.
'0 Case C-251/95, Sabel BV v. Puma AG & Rudolf Dassler Sport, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6191, 118, 20 (1998).
6223, It 18, 20, 119981 1 C.M.L.R. 445, 470-71,
24'Frank I. Schechter, The RationalBasis of TrademarkProtection,40 HARvARD L. REV.
813, 825 (1926-27) (providing the seminal thesis on dilution).
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Requires reputation
Requires unfairness/detriment
Goods must be dissimilar
Goods may be dissimilar
Likelihood of Confusion Required?

4(1)(b)
No
No
No
No
Yes

273
5(2)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Under Article 5(2) of the Directive, reputation is necessary and
the test is unfair advantage or detriment, whereas Article 4(1)(b)
does not require reputation or any unfair advantage or detriment.
Article 5(2) is intended to protect against dilution by the use of an
established mark on different goods by persons not connected with
the proprietor.2 4 2 A simple illustration will demonstrate that
there is no anomaly in the effect between Articles 4(1)(b) and 5(2).
Assume that the mark "Porsher"is used on condominiums. This
will undoubtedly take unfair advantage of the fabulously famous
Porsche®registered for automobiles alone. Although not confusing,
such a situation will come under Article 5(2). If "Porsher" were to
be used on similar goods like motorcycles, there would be a
likelihood of confusion, implicating Article 4(1)(b). This illustrates
that there is no anomaly. If a mark is so similar that it takes
unfair advantage or causes detriment even when used on dissimilar
goods, then it will probably cause origin confusion when used on
similar products.24 3
The protection contemplated by the dilution provisions is not for
product origin/consumer confusion but rather for preserving the
distinctive quality of the mark. The lesser protection for the same
mark from similar signs for similar goods under Article 4(1)(b) is
justified because the mark does not enjoy a sufficient reputation in
the public. Since there is nothing to protect, the extra protection
from dilution should not be expected. 2 Trademark owners must

242 CORNISH,

supra note 27, § 17-96.

Prescott, supra note 3, at 320.
The conditions for protection against dilution are: (a) the trademark has reputation
in the relevant Member State or Community; (b) use of an identical or similar sign for
dissimilar goods or services is without due cause; and (c) such use takes unfair advantage
of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or repute of the trademark. Confusion is
apparently not a condition for protection. In British Sugar, Justice Jacob commented that
the UK equivalent of Article 5(2)-i.e. the Trade Marks Act, 1994, Ch. 26 § 10(1) (U.K.)-may
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accept the fact that more work needs to be done to enhance the
reputation of their mark to enjoy the luxuries of dilution protection.
Until that is achieved, trademark owners must be content with the
traditional protection that is based on "likelihood of confusion."
If the market leaders' marks do not have the requisite reputation, they are not entitled to protection. Therefore, brand owners
must rely on the traditional origin/confusion trademark infringement of Article 4(1)(b). These brand owners may find relief if they
can prove that the public may think that there is some "connection
between the proprietors of the sign and those of the mark and
confuses them."2 5 This issue was examined in the Canon case.
Alternatively, these leading brand owners must seek recourse
against look alikes under the specific national unfair competition
laws, misappropriation laws, or passing-off laws of the respective
Member States.246 In the United Kingdom it was passing off2to
47
use Puffin chocolate biscuits against Penguin chocolate biscuits;
in Germany it was unfair competition to advertise "Perrier" as "A
Champagne among Mineral Waters."248 Finally, in France it was
unfair competition for Yves St. Laurent to use "Champagne" for
scent.249 Therefore, with Sabel's rejection of the Benelux association approach, there is little room for market brand owners to
assert that private brands/look-alikes infringe Article 4(1)(b) in an
anti-dilution sense.
Clearly, brand owners have wrongly characterized Sabel as
standing for a species of "anti-dilution" protection within Article
4(1)(b) or that "distinctiveness" alone, without confusion on the part
of the public, can be another head of infringement liability within
Article 4(1)(b). As stated earlier, the dilution provisions in the

be covered by the Benelux Court of Justice's decision in the case of the British Sugar PLC
v. James Robertson & Sons Ltd., [1996] R.P.C. 281 (U.K. Ch.). See also 7 INTL REV. INDUS.
PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 420 (1976) (noting that the owner of CLAERYN Dutch gin was able
to prevent Colgate from using KLAREIN liquid cleanser).
usSabel, 1997 E.C.R. at 1-6222,
16, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. at 470, 16.
2s SANDERS, supra note 24, at 24-69 (detailing the way in which unfair competition law
is shaped
in various countries).
7
24 United Biscuits (UK) Ltd. v. Asda Stores Ltd., [1997] R.P.C. 513 (U.K Ch.); see also
John Benjamin, Penguin v.Puffin, 19 EuR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 484 (1997) (describing the
Court's analysis of United Biscuit).
2" 19 INTL REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 682, 683 (1988).
24 16 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. D-74 (1994).
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Directive are found elsewhere and not in Article 4(1)(b). Therefore,
if the market brand leaders initiate an action against look-alikes
without confusion on the part of the public, Sabel indicates that the
likely result would be that of Conopco, Inc. v. May Department
Stores Co.,250 with a finding of non-infringement and a requirement of likely consumer confusion.
In addition to dilution, the element of distinctiveness in Sabel
will be discussed further since it is one of the elements in the
matrix of likelihood of confusion as well as the scope and applicability of the scope of the dilution provisions of the Directive. This
article will now consider several trademark cases which concern all
of the issues that are on the docket of the European Court of
Justice. It is expected that the ECJ's eventual rulings will
undoubtedly shed some more light on these provisions.
H. DISTINCTIVENESS AND ORIGIN - CAUGHT IN THE CANON CROSSFIRE

First, the impact of the distinctiveness of a mark in the determination of likelihood of confusion was recently discussed in Canon
Kabushiki Kaisha v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.2"' There, the
ECJ reaffirmed the Sabel approach, reasoning that likelihood of
confusion on the part of the public "must be appreciated globally,
taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the
case." 2 2 Further, the court reasoned that the "more distinctive
the mark, the greater the risk of confusion."2"'
25 46 F.3d 1556,32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 1994). This case demonstrates that
an insistence on likelihood of source confusion may lead to product packaging protection
being denied. Conopco relaunched its VASELINE INTENSIVE CARE LOTION with a new
formula and a new image. Thirty Seven million dollars million US dollars was spent to
advertise the relaunch. The defendants introduced look-alikes under their own brand name
which bore a comparative reference to Conopco's trademarks VASELINE and INTENSIVE
CARE on the label. However, the defendants' lotion was differentiated by the prominent
display on the front of the defendants' packaging of the black and white logo of Venture
Stores Inc. (a subsidiary of May). The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court's findings of trade dress and trademark infringement. Conopco had failed to establish
actual or likely consumer confusion. The fact that one consumer gave evidence that she
believed the Venture lotion to be made for them by Conopco was irrelevant unless it could
be shown that such belief was widespread among consumers. Id.
2" [Hereinafter Canon] available at <http'//europa.eu.int:80/cj/en/jurisp/index.htm>
(visited Mar. 1999).
252
Id.
16 (citing Sabel, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6191, 1-6224, 22, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 445, 471, 91
22 (1998)).
m Id. 1 18 (citing Sabel 1997 E.C.R. at 1-6224, 1 24, [1998] 1 C.M.L.R. at 471, 1 24).
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Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer's (MGM's) trademark application for
"CANNON" was opposed by Canon Kabushiki Kaisha's (CKK's)
mark "Canon, "2 " and although this case concerned the determination of confusion vis-a-vis the similarity of goods and services
under Article 4(1)(b) rather than the similarity of marks per se, the
ECJ reaffirmed the supremacy of the origin function of European
trademark law. The ECJ reasoned that "the risk that the public
might believe that the goods or services in question come from the
same undertaking or, as the case may be, from economically-linked
undertakings, constitutes a likelihood of confusion within the
meaning of Article 4(1)(b)."255
Since the "Canon" and "CANNON" marks were determined to be
identical," 6 and the goods were dissimilar, this case poses the
confusion/origin question in its purest form. The ECJ decided that
confusion can arise even where the public perception is that the
goods or services have different places of production. By contrast,
there can be no such likelihood where it does not appear that the
public could believe that the goods or services come from the same
undertaking, or, as the case may be, from economically-linked
undertakings."

2

MGM filed a trademark application to register "CANNON" to be used in respect of

"films recorded on video tape cassettes (video film cassettes); production, distribution and
projection of films for cinemas and television organizations." Id. 2. MGM's application was
opposed by CKK because CKK believed that "CANNON" infringed upon its earlier registered
trade mark, "Canon", which was registered "in respect of 'still and motion picture cameras
and projectors; television filming and recording devices, television retransmission devices,
television receiving and reproduction devices, including tape and disc devices for television
recording and reproduction.'" Id. 1 3. When MGM's application was examined by the
German authorities, the first examiner considered the goods and services of the opposing
parties to be similar; and therefore refused to register the mark "CANNON". The second
examiner set aside that decision and dismissed the opposition on the ground that there was
no similarity. CKK appealed to the Bundespatentgericht (Federal Patent Court), but its
appeal was dismissed. CKK then appealed to the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Supreme
Court); and in the context of those proceedings, the present referral was made to the ECJ.
Id. 1 11.
2m

Id.

29.

See id. 1 9 (stating that "CANNON" and "Canon" are pronounced in the same way and
that "Canon" has a reputation).
" Id. 30. The German Bundesgerichtshofrequested that the European Court of Justice
answer the following question: "May account be taken, when assessing the similarity of the
goods or services covered by the two marks, of the distinctive character, in particular the
reputation of the mark with earlier priority ... so that, in particular, likelihood of confusion
within the meaning of Article 4(1)(b) of the Directive 89/104/EEC must be taken to exist even
2
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Therefore, there may still be actionable confusion even when the
public perceives that goods are manufactured in different places if
they believe that the goods come from the same business or from
economically linked undertakings. This ECJ ruling adopts the
Advocate General's Opinion that "if, despite recognising that the
goods or services have different places of origin, the public is likely
to believe that there is a link between the two concerns, there will
be a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of the Directive. 25 8
It is clear that the ECJ decision in Canon was based on one of
the two approved types of actionable confusion in Sabel." 9 This
approach matches the ECJ's origin function trademark jurisprudence from Terrapin to Sabel where confusion on the part of the
public is the sole controlling criterion. Brand owners seeking relief
against lookalikes should pay close attention to these provisions.
In elaborating on the distinctiveness element of "CANON," the
ECJ opined that distinctiveness is a matter of degree. 260 A trade
mark might be particularly distinctive either because it is well
known or because it is of an unusual character. The more well
known or unusual a trade mark is, the more likely it is that
consumers might be confused into believing there to be a trade
connection between the marked goods or services and goods or
services bearing the same or a similar mark. These comments
show that the distinctiveness of the mark serves the function of
identifying the source or origin of the goods. In this case, distinctiveness may lead to the conclusion that there was some trade
connection between the purveyors of these sort of goods and
services and the owners of goods and services. Therefore, these
comments further demonstrate that Canon concerns the second
type of confusion, "likelihood of indirect confusion or association,"
that was accepted by Sabel.2 6 ' However, Canon stands for the
proposition that distinctiveness of the mark is not a shortcut
toward finding infringement, and there must still be confusion on

if the public attributes the goods and/or services to different origins.. ?" Id. 1 11.
"
Canon, supra note 251, 1 30 (opinion of Advocate General Jacobs) (emphasis added).
"' Case C-251/95, Sabel BV v. Puma AG & Rudolf Dassler Sport, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6191,
[1998] 1 C.M.L.R. 445 (1998).
'o Canon, supra note 251, 1 17, 18.
2611Id.
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the part of the public. This holding is stated in the final paragraph
of the judgement." 2 The operative element in this determination
of confusion is the "economically-linked undertakof likelihood
ings. " 263 This shows the dominance of the likelihood of confusion
element. Therefore, distinctiveness of the mark is an important
factor in cases involving identical marks with dissimilar goods (like
Canon) but not in cases involving the similarity of marks and
identical goods (like Sabel).
The Canon judgement is not much different from the result in
The European case. Their similar results may be of some comfort
to market brands, because if one's mark is sufficiently distinctive,
there is slightly more protection. However, the hurdle of consumer
confusion must still be overcome, and the Canon Opinion strikes a
proper balance. It recognizes that the concept of confusion should
not be carried too far so as to hinder the free movement of goods.
In any event, the next several months may see the evolution of
a Community solution to this maddening morass of issues concerning distinctiveness, dilution and famous marks in the EC.
I. FUTURE DECISIONS TO LOOK OUT FOR

Advocate General Jacobs (AG Jacobs) issued an Opinion for
another trademark case pending before the ECJ. In Bayerische
Motorenwerke AG and BMW Nederland BV v. Ronald Karel
Deenik,2" the ECJ decided the interpretation and effect of Article
5. He addressed whether a trademark owner can "object to the use
of his trade mark by a third party in order to refer to the provision
of services relating to his genuine trade-marked goods, when he has
not registered his trade mark in respect of the type of services in

Id. 30.
Id.
2" Case C-63/97, Bayerische Motorenwerke AG and BMW Nederland BV v. Ronald Karel
Deenik (Eur. Ct. J. Apr. 2, 1998) [Hereinafter Bayerische] available at
Bayerische
<httpJ/europa.eu.intcj/en/act/9810en.htm#C-63/97> (visited Mar. 1999).
Motorenwerke AG (BMW AG) opposed the unauthorized use of statements such as
"Specialist in BMWs" or "specialised in BMWs" by an unauthorized second-hand car dealer,
Mr. Deenik, as such use infringed BMW's registered marks. BMW lost the first instance and
appeal proceedings, and then appealed to the Hoge Raad der Nederlander (Supreme Court
of Netherlands) who referred the matter to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary
ruling.
w2

2

3
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question."26 5 There are several important points to note.
First, it is curious that AG Jacobs has used the restrictive
"genuine and properly substantiated likelihood" language in his
Opinion. 6 This is a strict requirement that the plaintiff prove
that the public will be led to believe that Mr. Deenik was authorized by BMW to sell its cars. An identical requirement was
rejected in Sabel in relation to Article 4(1)(b), yet it appears that
AG Jacobs believes that this is an appropriate standard for Article
5(1)(a) 7 It will be interesting to see how the ECJ deals with
this question.
Secondly, Advocate General Jacobs observed that
[tihe essential issue is whether there is sufficient
similarity to give rise to a likelihood of confusion on
the part of the public ....
That suggests that what
is relevant in this case is whether there is a likelihood of the public being confused into thinking that
there is some sort of trade connection between the
respective suppliers of the goods or services in
question. 68
This observation is identical to the Canon decision regarding
"economically linked undertakings" confusion.2 69
Finally, AG
Jacobs recognized the special importance of the reputation of a
mark. He concluded that BMW can only object to the unauthorized
advertising if it is "established that the use of the mark for that
purpose seriously damages the reputation of the mark, or that the
use of the mark is designed to lead the public to believe that the
garage is an authorized dealer."270

2

ld. 1 1.

2"

Id.

1 39, 41.

Id. 1 34-42. Article 5(1)(a) "entitles the trade-mark owner to prevent all third parties
not having his consent from using in the course of trade 'any sign which is identical with the
trade mark in relation to goods or services which are identical with those for which the trade
mark is registered'." Id. 1 34.
2m Id. 9145.
UCanon, supra note 251, 1 29.
27
0 Bayerische, supra note 264, 1 57.
m
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Another pending European Court of Justice case, GeneralMotors
Corporation v. Yplon SA,27 1 (hereinafter CHEVY) concerns the
mark "CHEVY." Advocate-General Jacobs delivered his Opinion in
CHEVY,17 giving useful guidance on the interpretation
of Article
273
5(2) of the Trade Marks Directive (89/104/EEC).
General Motors has a Benelux trade mark registration for
CHEVY in respect to motor vehicles. 7 Yplon used the mark in
relation to detergents and cleaning products. 75 The Benelux
trade mark court asked the European Court of Justice to decide two
questions: (1) how to interpret the concept of a trade mark "with
a reputation"; and (2) must the reputation extend throughout the
three Benelux countries, or is it sufficient that its reputation is
established by one, or part of one, of those countries? First, AG
Jacobs concluded that, for the purposes of Article 5(2), a mark must
be known by a significant part of the relevant sectors of the
public.276 Moreover, its reputation need not be as strong as that
of a well-known mark.27 7 Secondly it is sufficient for the reputation to extend to a substantial part of the Benelux territory, at
least part of one of the three countries.27 8
AG Jacobs commented that the standard for determining whether
the trade mark has a "reputation" is lower than the standard for a
well-known mark under the Paris Convention or TRIPs. Such wellknown marks prevent use even where the mark is not registered;
additionally, AG Jacobs commented that the ECJ decided in Sabel
that there is no requirement for confusion under Article 5(2), but
the plaintiff needs to satisfy the other requirements of Article 5(2).
The remaining requirements of Art. 5(2) are: the absence of due

27 Case C-375/97, availableat Proceedings of the Court of Justice and the Court of First

Instance of the European Communities - New Cases, n" 32/97 (Nov. 24 to 28, 1997)
[hereinafter Case C-375/97] <http://europa.eu.int:80/cj/en/act/act97/9732en.htm#NEW>
(visited
Mar. 1999).
2
2

Id.

273 The Trademarks Directive deals with infringement of marks "with a reputation" by

the use of the mark on goods or services which are not similar to those for which the mark
is registered.
274 C-375/97, supra note 271,
3.
275 Id.

4.

276Id.
48.
277 Well-known mark is defined by the Paris Convention or TRIPS.
21 C-375/97, supra note 271,
48.
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cause for the defendant to adopt the mark and the element of
unfair advantage or detriment to the reputation of the mark.279
He said all the issues should be considered together on a
case-by-case basis. Thus, the practice in some EU countries of
requiring fixed percentages in market research to establish
reputation may be inadequate.
The Attorney-General's approach was clearly influenced by the
Court's decisions in Sabel and Canon, which required questions of
infringement to be considered "globally," by taking account of all
relevant factors. His answer to the second question is particularly
relevant in jurisdictions where there are linguistic or cultural
sub-divisions. However, it could also apply to marks with a local
reputation. It will be interesting to receive the ECJ's guidance on
that question.
Furthermore, the pending case of Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co.
° will determine the quantitative
GmbH v. Klijsen Handel BV..
yardstick for establishing the likelihood of confusion based on some
very technical linguistic criteria. The courts must also decide
whether there is any quantitative yardstick for establishing the
degree of recognition of a mark, as measured in terms of percentage
of X terms, in the relevant trade circles. The owner of the senior
trademark "Lloyds" is seeking to prevent the junior user from
adopting "Loints" for shoes and footwear.21

Therefore, it is clear that Sabel will be the first of several
important ECJ decisions that will define the scope of protection for
marks, marks of reputation and well-known marks and explain the
interplay of the relevant provisions of the Directive. The state of
EC law of trademarks is still in evolution.

'7 See id.
20 (reciting Article 5(2): "Any Member State may also provide that the
proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all third parties not having his consent from using the
trademark ... where use of that sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is
detrimental to, the trademark." (emphasis added))..
2 Id. Case C-342/97, availableat Proceedings of the Court of Justice and the Court of
First Instance of the European Communities - New Cases, n" 28/97 (Oct. 20 to 24 1997)
(visited Mar. 1999) <httpJ/europa.eu.int:80/cj/en/act/act97/9728en.htm#NEW>.
28' Id.
4. Article 4(l)(b) of the Directive will be of relevance here since the goods are
not similar.
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CONCLUSION - MAY You LIVE IN INTERESTING TIMES

The ECJ should be lauded for adopting a prudent middle ground
in Sabel, as without any statutory language to the contrary, the
effect of Article 4(1)(a) did not give trademark owners any unbridled "property right" in their mark except the right to prevent the
likelihood of confusion on the part of the public. Nevertheless, the
ECJ has acknowledged that there is some place for non-origin
inputs (e.g., the distinctiveness element) in the determination of
likelihood of confusion. The ECJ's exhortation of considering the
"overall impression of the marks" and "global appreciation of the
visual, aural or conceptual similarity of the marks" recognizes the
dynamism of infringement analysis beyond the static and pedantic
examination endorsed by the UK courts.
An unclear/confusing rule introduced during the harmonization
process of EC trademark laws caused the raging "likelihood of
association" controversy, but controversies are unavoidable in any
process of change. Nevertheless, one must be vigilant in the postSabel European trademark order and not adopt an overly broad
test of infringement under Article 4(1)(b) if the mark was distinctive enough throughper se distinctiveness or reputation without the
requirement of confusion on the part of the public. Neither should
one mistake Sabel as an obeisant adherence to the overly rigorous
UK origin/confusion approach.
This article has argued that there is ample evidence in Sabel
itself that distinctive marks which seek protection under Article
4(1)(b) of the Directive are still subject to the requirement of the
likelihood of confusion of the public. Furthermore, it has argued
that Sabel has at least proven that there is no monopoly over
common sense on either side of the trademark infringement
analysis fence. Applying a fair reading of the Sabel judgment, this
author submits that Sabel created an intermediate standard of
determining likelihood of association for registration and infringement purposes. The element of distinctiveness is not the shortcut
for the operation of the public's likelihood of confusion under Article
4(1)(b) of the Directive, and the ECJ decision in Canon supports
this interpretation. Sabel has conclusively slain the specter of the
disorder surrounding the Benelux infringement action of association in the strict sense, but Sabel has also exorcised the view that
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the Directive is controlled by the conservative and under-protective
regime of UK trademark law.
There remains the evil of uncertainty surrounding concepts such
as the precise meaning of the distinctiveness element in Sabel,
marks of reputation and dilution. These concepts will hopefully
receive further clarification from the issued ECJ judgments in the
BMW, General Motors and Lloyds cases. Whatever the outcomes,
European trademark jurists and practitioners may not be too
displeased to endure the Chinese proverbial imprecation of "May
You Live in Interesting Times."
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